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INTRODUCTION

The surrogate motherhood practice is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Perhaps in the past persons unable to have children sometimes persuaded sisters, friends, or strangers to have a
baby for them,1 but over the past few years the practice has become much more widespread, and has turned into an industry.2
As the practice of surrogate motherhood has "come out of the
closet" and been extensively publicized during the past few
years, it has come to seem a more legitimate and available alter-

native to persons wanting babies, especially infertile couples.
Others hearing about the possibilities of surrogate motherhood
decide that the job of a surrogate might be a good way to earn a
substantial sum of money.3 And as the practice increases, the
problems that inhere in it become more obvious and increasingly
find their way into the courts.
Many variations are possible, but the paradigmatic case of
surrogate motherhood involves a couple who want a child but
discover they cannot have their own biological child because the
wife is infertile.4 In the past the only recourse in such a situation
1. In biblical times, Abraham and Jacob had women have babies for them because
their wives were infertile. These children, however, did not consider the infertile wife to
be their mother. See Genesis 16:2, 30:3.
2. Contract surrogacy emerged around 1976. An estimated 500 children have been
born in the United States from surrogate arrangements since then. Of these 500 contracts, 495 have been carried out without incident. See Krautheimer, The Ethics of
Human Manufacture, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 4, 1987, at 17, 19.
There are currently about a dozen surrogacy centers in operation throughout the
country to which persons can apply if they want to employ a surrogate or if they want to
serve as a surrogate. While rates vary, the center generally makes a substantial sum of
money each time it engineers a surrogacy contract. See generally Lacayo, Whose Child is
This?, TIME, Jan. 19 1987, at 56, 57.
3. A poll conducted by the Gallup organization interviewed 766 adults by telephone
on January 7 and 8, 1987. The poll asked: If you wanted a child but could not have one
because of fertility or other health problems, would you consider having a child by a
surrogate mother? Thirty-five percent of the respondents answered yes. Women were
also asked to answer the following question: Surrogate mothers are paid about $10,000 to
bear a child for another couple. If you were a young woman in good health, would you
consider bearing another couple's child? Fifteen percent answered yes. Surrogate
Mothers: A Newsweek Poll, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 48 [hereinafter Newsweek
Poll].
4. There are no serious empirical studies concerning surrogacy. One derives a fairly
consistent picture, however, from the voluminous writing that is available on the subject.
Many newspapers-including the New York Times, the Boston Globe and the Los Angeles Times-have published articles describing and evaluating different aspects of surro-
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would have been adoption, and that still is the most obvious and
commonly used method of obtaining a child. Adoption, however,
is notoriously more difficult today than it has been in the past.'
Moreover, a couple who feel it important to have a biological
gacy continually during the past year, while the Baby "M" case has been pending in New
Jersey, In re Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, cert. granted, 107 N.J. 140,
526 A.2d 203 (1987), and there are also a great many other articles on the subject of
surrogacy. Readings I have found especially helpful include Krautheimer, supra note 2;
Lacayo, supra note 2; Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for
Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641 (1984); Kantrowitz, Who Keeps Baby "M"?, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 19, 1987, at 44; Slovenko, Obstectric science and the developing role of the psychiatrist in surrogate motherhood, 13 J. PSYCH. & L. 487 (1985); Bowal, Surrogate Procreation: A Motherhood Issue in Legal Obscurity, 9 QUEENS L.J., 5 (1983); Mellown, An Incomplete Picture: The Debate About Surrogate Motherhood, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 231
(1985); Blakely, Surrogate Mothers: For Whom Are They Working?, Ms., Mar. 1983, at
18; Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11 FAM. L. RPTR.
(BNA) 3001 (Jan. 29, 1985); Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7
WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 107 (1982); Peterson, Baby M Case: Surrogate Mothers Vent
Feelings, N.Y. Times, March 2, 1987, at B1, col. 2 [hereinafter Peterson]; Goleman,
Motivations of Surrogate Mothers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at C1 [hereinafter
Goleman]; Rovner, Ethical Choices in Reproductive Technology, THE WASHINGTON POST
WEEKLY OF MED., HEALTH

& FITNESS, Sept. 9, 1986, at 15; Note, Surrogate Motherhood

and Baby Selling, 20 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Baby Selling];
O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N. C. L. REV.,
127 (1986); N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER (1981) [hereinafter KEANE &
BREO]. On the current situation concerning adoption, see generally NATIONAL COMMITTEE
ON ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK (1985) [hereinafter ADOPTION FACTBOOK]; Frontline:
Desperately Seeking Baby, (WGBH television broadcast, March 3, 1987) [hereinafter

Frontline] (discussing private adoptions); W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ E. Russo, ADOPTIONS
WITHOUT AGENCIES: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 165-66 (1978) [hereinafter
MEEZAN, KATZ & Russo].
5. There is a shortage in this country of healthy, white newborns available for adoption. This shortage results from the prevalence of contraception and abortion and from
many unmarried mothers deciding to raise their own children.
In 1982, the year for which the best statistics are available, there were 141,861 adoptions. Of these 91,141 were adoptions by relatives. The remaining 50,720 were unrelated
adoptions. Of those 17,602 were unrelated adoptions of healthy infants, 5,707 were unrelated adoptions of children adopted from other countries, 14,005 were unrelated adoptions of children with special needs, and 9,591 were adoptions of children by foster parents. (These four categories are not mutually exclusive.) See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra
note 4, at 102. In 1984, two million couples competed for the 58,000 children placed for
adoption (a 35-to-i ratio). See Wilson, Adoption, It's not Impossible, BUSINESS WEEK,
July 8, 1985, at 112.
An exacerbating factor is that many couples are delaying the start of their families,
so infertility may not be discovered until a couple is in their thirties. Couples who ultimately decide to adopt, especially if they have taken the time to undergo infertility
treatments, come to discover that they are too old to be acceptable to conventional adoption agencies, which prefer couples under 35. See Lorio, supra note 4, at 1642 n.4; Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 47.
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connection with their child may prefer to find a surrogate
mother, because that way their child will share the husband-father's genes.'
In the paradigmatic case, the surrogate mother is a woman
in her twenties who has previously had children.7 Many surrogate mothers are married and live with their husband, or their
husband and children, while others are single women. 8 When a
surrogate motherhood arrangement is made, the woman who has
agreed to be the surrogate mother is inseminated with sperm
from the man of the infertile couple. This procedure can be done
either by artificial insemination' or by sexual intercourse. The
mother agrees that after she bears the child so conceived, she
will turn the child over to the infertile couple. The expectation
is that the couple then will adopt the child as their own and the
surrogate mother will give up all parental rights.
The remainder of this paper will deal with the problems this
arrangement poses for the three principal actors-the infertile
couple and the surrogate mother-and also for the child and for
society at large. It will assess how the legal system should address the problems and also whether it should allow, encourage,
prohibit, or discourage the practice of surrogate motherhood.
For convenience and readability, I shall sometimes refer to the
infertile couple as John and Diane and to the surrogate mother
as Mary.
The most dramatic problem that can and does arise in such
arrangements is when the mother, Mary, decides that she wants
6. The father in the much-publicized Baby "M" case is said to have felt "compelled"
to continue his family's bloodline which was threatened with extinction because, aside
from his parents who were also no longer alive, all other living relatives had been killed
in the Holocaust. Hanley, Reporter's Notebook: Grief Over Baby M, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1987, at B1, col. 2; In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. at 335, 338, 525 A.2d at 1138-39.
7. See Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 47 (A statistically typical candidate is a 25 year
old Christian married woman with a high school education and at least one child). See
also, Slovenko, supra note 4, at 503, stating that women who have been pregnant before
are much better candidates for surrogate motherhood, and that some psychiatrists believe that they are the only ones capable of giving "informed" consent.
8. One well known surrogacy center reports it does not require that the surrogate be
married, but it does require that she have at least one biological child living with her.
See Mellown, supra note 4, at 238.
9. Artificial insemination is the process by which male sperm is introduced into a
female patient with a needleless syringe. Williams, Differential Treatment of Men and
Women by Artificial Reproduction Statutes, 21 TULSA L. J. 463, 464 (1986).
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to keep the child that she is carrying. She may decide shortly
after becoming pregnant that she wants to keep her child; she
may decide late in pregnancy; she may decide At birth or after
the child is born. The ultimate issue in all such cases is whether
the woman bearing the child will be able to keep the child or
whether the infertile couple for whom she agreed to bear the
child have a right to the child.
One reason the situation is difficult is that all the actors
may be very sympathetic people,'0 and in this conflict they all
have very sympathetic positions. By changing her mind, the
mother is showing maternal feelings for her baby that are surely
not reprehensible. It is true that she had promised to give up the
baby, but her change of heart seems more understandable than
dishonorable. John and Diane, on the other hand, have been trying for a long time to have a child, and now they are excited and
happy that this child is to be theirs. They have justifiably relied
on the agreement that Mary made with them. And half of the
baby's genes have come from John.
How is the law to respond to this kind of problem? A jurisdiction may actively regulate or prohibit the practice of surrogate motherhood," but even if its laws are silent on the subject,
10. Persons who apply to be surrogate mothers, according to psychologists, are likely
to be people with a high degree of empathy for others. Many of them feel the pain of the
couple who is unable to have children and are motivated not only by money, but also by
a desire to help.
As one pregnant surrogate expressed, "I'm not going to cure cancer or become
Mother Teresa, but a baby is one thing I can sort of give back, something I can give to
someone who couldn't have it any other way." Kantrowitz, supra note 4, at 48 (quoting
Lisa Walters, a 32-year old Grantsburg, Wis. housewife and mother of two). Another
woman decided to become a surrogate when she was working for three obstetricians who
specialize in infertility: "I saw the disappointment and the anguish that accompanies
infertility. . . . It was so unfair." Id. at 46-47 (quoting Becky McKnight, a 35-year-old
Los Angeles mother of three).
Surrogate motherhood applicants may also be compensating for an experience in
their past such as being adopted themselves, giving up a child for adoption, or having an
abortion. Goleman, supra note 4, at C1. See also Kantrowitz, supra note 4.
11. In fact, few jurisdictions have any specific rules, although many are considering
them and debating which rules to adopt. In Britain, a surrogate mother was permitted to
repudiate the contract as being against public policy. A. v. C. [1985] F.L.R. 445 (Eng. Ct.
App. 1978). A report of Britain's Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and
Embryology suggested that:
Legislation should be introduced to render criminal the creation or the operation in the United Kingdom of agencies whose purposes include the recruitment of women for surrogate pregnancy or making arrangements for individuals
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disputes unavoidably come to the courts. If, for example, Mary
does not turn the child over at birth, then John and Diane, if
they are unable to persuade her to change her mind, have several alternatives: (1) Though sad, they may accept her decision,
and litigation will be avoided. (2) They may come to court to ask
its help in transferring the child to them. (3) They may instead
employ self help and steal the child from Mary. If they do that,
Mary is likely to seek the courts' help in getting the child back
and in preventing such incidents in the future.
As courts face disputes concerning the parenthood and custody of the child, how is the judge to decide the issue in a jurisdiction whose laws are silent concerning the subject of surrogacy? While it might appear that the problem is the absence of
applicable law to draw upon in such a situation, the real problem is an excess of available bodies of law.
Several different bodies of law arguably are applicable, and
the various possibilities lead to different results. Contract law
might govern the agreement between the parties and it might
support enforcement of the bargain. On the other hand, existing
laws against selling babies might render the agreement illegal,
and might even suggest that the parties to such an agreement
could be subject to criminal sanctions. Or a court might look to
laws governing adoption in order to compare the rights of the
birth mother with those of the would-be adoptive parents.
As an alternative to relying upon the contract, the biological
father can attempt to obtain custody Under the laws that govern
the rights of a biological father who is not married to the mother
or couples who wish to utilise the services of a carrying mother; such legislation
should be wide enough to include both profit and non-profit making
organizations.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN

Chairman: Dame Mary Warnock, July 1984, at 85 [hereinafter Warnock Report]. Subsequently, in 1985, commercial surrogacy arrangements
were banned in Britain. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49.
In the United States, the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, in its
study of the problem, expressed dismay at the lack of empirical evidence on surrogacy
and found it could not make firm conclusions about whether surrogacy should be permitted without that evidence. Ethics Committee, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies 67S (1986) [hereinafter Ethics Committee]. One member of the
committee, in dissent, believed that surrogacy should be made illegal forthwith. Id. In
New York State, the State Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that surrogacy
contracts should be "legal and enforceable." N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1987, at 26.
FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY,
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of a newborn baby; or the biological mother instead could find
this law advantageous, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the various parties" and also upon the uncertainties
of how this law will be interpreted and will develop. Finally,
state provisions specifically applicable to the rights and obligations of sperm donors could govern in cases where the surrogate
has been artificially inseminated. A judge is not, of course, limited to choosing between existing bodies of law, 3 but at least
initially, the judge may confront the problem by inquiring which
of these bodies of law is most appropriate.
SURROGACY VIEWED THROUGH THE LENSE OF CONTRACT LAW

It would most benefit the would-be adoptive couple for surrogacy contracts to be enforced like any others-like contracts
for ordinary commercial services or for the exchange of a chattel.
It is arguable that, because conceiving and delivering a baby and
turning it over is involved, contract law should not apply or
should apply differently than when a transaction involves barter
of a simple chattel or commercial services. 4
12. In one surrogate motherhood case in which the mother decided to keep her child,
for example, the adopting couple retreated from litigation reportedly because the wife
was formerly a transvestite. Noyes v. Thrane, No. CF7614 (L.A. Cty. Super. Ct. 1981).
See Surrogate Mother Sues in L.A. Court to Keep Her Unborn Baby, L.A. Times, Mar.
21, 1981, at 1-1-1; Galen, Surrogate Law: Court Ruling, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 1.
13. If he or she conceives of surrogate motherhood as an altogether novel situation,
the judge may consider it more appropriate to mold some new law to meet the needs of
this new and different situation.
14. Often proponents of surrogacy contracts depict the contract as one for services
and not for exchange of a baby, in order to avoid the problem that laws forbid the exchange of a child for money. See, e.g., Frug, The Baby M Contract, 119 N.J.L.J. 337-38
(1987) ("[If she actually gives up her child at birth, [the surrogate mother]. . .is not
selling a child but selling the use of her womb.").
Although personal service contracts are traditionally not enforceable by specific performance, see CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1184, 1204-10 (1951) [hereinafter CORBIN], that
rule may not help the mother after she has completed her personal service of conceiving
and giving birth to the child; traditionally the rule could not be invoked to prevent
transfer of a completed object, such as an art work that had been commissioned and
already is completed. Describing the contract as one for personal services would, however, aid the mother who changed her mind before conception. It would also aid a woman who changed her mind after conception and before birth and who wants to abort
the fetus. Even apart from any stipulation in the contract, however, a pregnant woman
retains the right to abortion, See infra note 56-58 and accompanying text.
Moreover, despite the traditional rule that specific performance can be ordered
once the personal service is complete, a mother might argue that turning over her
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The ultimate issue society must face in deciding whether
and how contract law applies is whether it wants to prohibit
these contracts or, at the other extreme, whether it wants to enforce them. Even if it avoids these extremes, it must decide
whether to encourage or discourage them. Each state can decide
for itself what policy to pursue with respect to surrogacy, and
one would expect different policies to be adopted in different
1

jurisdictions.

5

Existing law does not dictate the outcome. It will be decided, by legislators or courts, according to their perceptions of
appropriate policy. The most forceful argument against surrogacy arrangements is that they violate public policy-that the
balance of interests is such that society should either invalidate
the contracts or make them unenforceable. Moreover, existing
laws prohibiting babyselling could be interpreted to encompass
surrogacy arrangements. Reasons of public policy will probably
also govern whether that interpretation is adopted.
A. Are the Contracts Illegal?
The important issues are those of policy. Under traditional
contract law, surrogacy arrangements would appear to be enforceable. But contract law makes exceptions for exploitation or
unconscionability, and it is not foreign to contract law for public
policy to dictate that the parties' bargain not be followed, or
child-severing her connection with her baby-is such a uniquely personal act that it
cannot be forced upon her, under reasoning similar to that which prevents courts from
enforcing personal service contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367
comment a (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT CONTRACTS] (describing the rationale behind personal service contracts and stating specific performance will not be ordered
where compulsion is against public policy) I owe this last suggestion to Professor Mary
Joe Frug.
15. One result is that persons living in states where surrogacy is not legal will not be
denied the use of surrogates but will still be able to use the services of agencies and
surrogate mothers who live in states where it is legal. This lowest common denominator
phenomenon-allowing the state with the least restrictive rules effectively to control the
nation-is common in family law, where the lowest age for marriage, the least restrictive
consanguinity rules concerning marriage, the lowest requirements for divorce, etc. can
often be used by persons from all jurisdictions.
Many jurisdictions allow adoption only to resident prospective parents, but others
allow out-of-staters to adopt; some allow out-of-staters to adopt special needs children
but not others, or allow out-of-staters to adopt independently but not through an agency.
For a complete survey of the varying practices, see ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 4, at
76-85.
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that it not be binding. The policy questions that must be resolved here are: Should surrogate motherhood arrangements be
viewed as illegal under babyselling provisions? If not, should
state legislatures enact statutes prohibiting surrogate motherhood contracts? If surrogate motherhood contracts are to be
prohibited, should those few that are genuinely entered into for
no compensation, other than payment of expenses, also be prohibited, or should voluntary surrogacy be treated differently
from surrogacy for a fee? 6
1. Babyselling
Most surrogate contracts involve payment of a substantial
sum of money to the surrogate mother, in addition to her medical and perhaps living expenses during the pregnancy. Most contracts specify what monetary compensation will be paid to the
woman for her services in bearing the child. The fees paid range
anywhere from a couple of thousand up to a hundred thousand
dollars." The price contracts most commonly specify at this
time is ten thousand dollars. On the other hand, advertisements
of persons offering to be surrogate mothers, or searching for surrogate mothers, often mention a much higher price. 18 One reason
contracts frequently describe the arrangement as one for services is the parties' desire to avoid condemnation as a babyselling arrangement. A parent's surrender of a child for a fee-baby
selling-is a crime in all states. 19 In addition, many states have
16. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society preferred that surrogates
not receive payment "beyond compensation for expenses and their inconvenience" but
recognized the necessity of allowing payment. See Ethics Committee, supra note 11, at
67S.
17. The fee can vary in accordance with the surrogate mother's intelligence and attractiveness. Mellown, supra note 4, at 234. The problem has been characterized as "determining a Saks Fifth Avenue price tag for one woman as opposed to a K-Mart price tag
for another." Id. at 234-35, n.20 (quoting Brief for the Attorney General, Doe v. Kelley,
106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981) (citing to Blakely, supra note 4, at 18)).
18. The Boston Magazine recently ran an advertisement by a couple seeking a "tall,
trim, intelligent woman between the ages of 22 and 35" to be a surrogate mother for
them, and offering $50,000. See BOSTON MAGAZINE, Aug. 1985, at 285. Prices also can run
low; recent litigation involved a Mexican woman in San Diego paid $1500 as a surrogate,
who was fighting to keep her child. See Scott, Pair Duped Her on Surrogate Mother
Pact, Woman Tells Court, L.A. Times, Feb. 20, 1987, §1, at 22, col. 1.
19. See Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11 Fain.
L. Rep. (BNA) 3001 (Jan. 29, 1985).
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enacted so-called "Baby Broker Acts," which limit or prohibit
compensation of intermediaries in connection with the transfer
of a child.2"
Obviously the issue whether the contracts should be viewed
as void because they have an illegal purpose-the selling of babies-depends upon more than construction of the particular
words used in the particular state's law. One can easily imagine
arguments that surrogacy contracts do violate laws against selling babies-because consideration is paid to the mother to have
and turn over the child-or arguments that these contracts are
different from the babyselling at which the statute is
aimed-because the baby is not yet born, indeed is not even
conceived when the arrangement is made. Logic will not select
for a judge which approach to follow; instead the judge will be
heavily influenced by her or his views concerning whether the
state ought to prohibit these contracts or whether instead the
contracts serve a socially legitimate purpose.2 ' Similarly a legislature must address the normative issue in deciding how to regulate these arrangements, if at all.
2. Contracts Reciting Lack of Compensation
Seemingly in order to avoid babyselling charges, some contracts recite that no compensation (beyond medical expenses) is
to be paid. It is not believable that such a declaration is true in
very many cases. If the mother is not to be compensated for her
services, why has she agreed to perform them? Research does
indicate that in addition to monetary compensation there are
many motives that contribute to a decision to become a surrogate mother, but most of the time money is an important part of
the decision.22
There are, of course, circumstances in which it is easier to
believe a recital of no compensation. Some surrogate arrangements involve a sister or a good friend; and a few surrogate
20. Rushevsky, supra note 4, at 115.
21. As suggested previously, one argument against the banning of surrogacy arrangements in a liberal society is that they can be an "act of love and generosity."
Krautheimer, supra note 2, at 19. See also supra note 10.
22. One commentator notes that while surrogates can be motivated by non-financial
factors such as altruism and self-fulfillment, see supra note 10, most women become
surrogates for the money. Bowal, supra note 4, at 8-9.
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mothers might simply be empathetic with the dilemma of a
childless couple who are strangers and might seek to help, perhaps partly for psychological reasons of their own. Surrogates do
often report that they enjoy pregnancy; that attitude would contribute to their willingness to serve.
Nonetheless, it is the unusual case where the surrogate is
not paid and, as those who work with surrogate mothers acknowledge, 3 the primary motive for persons who enter the arrangement is usually monetary. Although there may be isolated
cases where the consideration is in fact limited to medical expenses, it seems likely that even in those instances where the
contract says there is no other consideration, some other payment has passed or is intended to pass. Sometimes as contested
custody cases develop, it becomes clear that this is the case.
In jurisdictions in which surrogacy is illegal-either as
babyselling or in its own right-recitals in the contract that no
compensation has been paid will have limited effectiveness. If
neither party questions the contract, and all wish to perform according to its terms, the recital may enable the contract to escape the jurisdiction's prohibitions. But if either party desires to
back out of the surrogacy contract, that party will be permitted
to show that the recital is false and that the contract is therefore
illegal. 4
Those few instances where it can actually be maintained
that the surrogate was not to be paid for her services, however,
would be the most obviously enforceable contracts under traditional contract law. 28 Those contracts alone do not risk running
23. See Mellown, supra note 4, at 234, 237-38.
24. Cf. CORBIN, supra note 14, §§ 130, 586.
25. The unpaid woman might argue that she has received no "consideration" that
would make her promise binding. But under traditional contract doctrine, giving sperm,
paying or promising to pay medical expenses, and promising to adopt the child would all
be consideration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 79 and comments. See also
id. §§ 71(2), 72, 75, 78 (1981).
It is interesting that the crime of babyselling most commonly requires that the perpetrator receive something of more obvious market value-not just paying expenses that
would not even be incurred except in service of the contract, or the donation of sperm
which is of little value to the recipient. While the father's promise, or detriment, or reliance could constitute consideration, or persons found to be performing as surrogates for
their own satisfaction and not for valuable reward could be deemed to receive consideration, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 32 comment b(4), that kind of consideration would seemingly not support a charge of babyselling. Much less is necessary, then,
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afoul of statutes prohibiting the selling of babies the way contracts paying substantial sums to the mother do.26
3. Should Surrogacy Contracts Be Prohibited on Grounds that
they Exploit Women and Commercialize Childbearing?
One of the most fundamental social problems that surrogate
motherhood contracts involve is the exploitation of women." It
is difficult to assess with any confidence whether surrogacy contracts are exploitative and whether exploitation is a valid reason
for prohibiting these arrangements.
If childless persons or couples are to pay a considerable sum
to constitute binding consideration than is necessary to constitute exchange in a typical
babyselling offense.
It is in the gulf between the two standards-consideration and valuable exchange for
purposes of babyselling-that surrogate contracts would still be enforceable, in a jurisdiction that decided to punish surrogacy arrangements under its babyselling laws.
26. This is a strange result indeed when one contemplates that the volunteer mother
who decides she wants to keep her child will be forced to give up her child while the
similar mother who was paid will keep her child because her contract is unenforceable.
27. Another commonly discussed "social problem" is that surrogacy challenges the
sanctity of the traditional family unit. The difficulty apparently is that one of the genetic
parents will not be part of the child's family unit. This problem underlies the opposition
of the Roman Catholic Church to "any role for a third party in donating or in gestating
the child." Since the same church supports adoption, an obvious contradiction in reasoning exists. Krautheimer, supra note 2, at 19.
On October 1, 1987, however, the complications that surrogacy could bring to traditional family structure were dramatically illustrated, as a surrogate mother in South Africa gave birth to her own grandchildren. They were triplets. Pat Anthony had served as
a surrogate for her daughter Karen, bearing the children conceived by Karen's ova being
fertilized by Karen's husband's sperm and implanted. Mrs. Anthony, both grandmother
and mother to the children, is recognized as the legal mother in South Africa, even
though she has a weaker case for motherhood than the kind of surrogate we have been
discussing, who provided the egg as well as the incubation.
Karen, the egg-donor, legally has three new siblings. But all plan for Karen and her
husband to adopt the children, so she will become their mother instead of their sister.
And in a cartoon welcoming their birth, one triplet claims to be the others' uncle. Boston
Globe, Oct. 2, 1987, at 1, col 3-4; CBS News, Oct. 1, 1987.
A less esoteric problem may be the reaction of the surrogate's older child or childreii
to their mother giving away the baby. See Peterson, supra note 4. Since there almost
invariably are older siblings, see supra notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text, surrogacy
arrangements may in this way be destructive to existing children and to their security in
their families.
Moreover, if surrogacy came to be widely practiced not only by infertile couples but
also when fertile women simply did not desire to undergo pregnancy themselves, there is
a risk that it would create an underclass of women used as breeders. Some, of course,
might see as a benefit of surrogacy the option it would give well-to-do women to free
themselves from pregnancy and childbirth.
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to a woman to conceive and bear a child for them, does that
constitute exploitation? Certainly the usual situation will involve a couple of considerably greater financial means than the
woman who agrees to be the surrogate. 8 Should the surrogate be
prohibited from entering into the agreement even if it is appealing to her? Arguably she should be able to make a living this
way, rather than by performing some kind of work that is much
more distasteful to her. Indeed if a woman is well paid for her
work, making for example $50,000, in addition to expenses-an
amount which many find not unreasonably large for performing
as a surrogate mother-and if this is an amount that it might
take her 3-5 years to earn in other work that is available to her,
the appeal of the surrogacy arrangement may be quite
understandable.2
A difficulty with assessing whether this does or does not involve exploitation that the law should be concerned with
preventing is that generous payment for the arrangement in
some sense makes the arrangement less exploitative. But in another sense, the more money that is offered, the harder it is to
resist for persons who do not have other means of livelihood, or
other means to make substantial sums of money.
Should the law protect persons against being tempted into
surrogacy arrangements by offers of money? Arguments that it
should rest largely upon a conviction that bearing and having a
baby is such a personal and almost sacred thing that it should
be held outside of the marketplace. A system of agencies reaping
profits by arranging for surrogate mothers, and surrogates earn28. The costs incurred by a hiring party range upward from $25,000. The magnitude
of the expense renders surrogacy available primarily to the affluent. Kantrowitz, supra
note 4, at 46.
One author suggests that reproductive technology, including surrogate motherhood,
is the first step toward a "developing ideology [in which] we are learning to see our
children as products, the products of conception." B. ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY: PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND THE FUTURE OF MOTHERHOOD 2 (1986) [hereinafter TENTATIVE PREGNANCY].

Rothman also states that "when we talk about the buying and sell-

ing of blood, the banking of sperm, the costs of hiring a surrogate mother, we are talking
about bodies as commodities. . . . The new technology of reproduction is building on
this commodification." Id.
29. Some women have had three children as surrogates. See Mellown, supra note 4,
at 236 n.33; Peterson, supra note 4.
Some persons who, in their 20s, enthusiastically performed as surrogate mothers,
feel great regret and guilt as they become older. See Peterson, supra note 4, at B1, col. 2.
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ing substantial fees by having babies,3 0commercializes childbearing to the detriment of us all.
A similar kind of protection of persons not financially welloff is involved in our laws against babyselling or childselling.
Those laws reflect a judgment that we do not want a society in
which persons having extreme financial difficulties are tempted
to barter away a child or children, if they are lucky enough to
have one attractive enough to produce a generous offer from a
well-to-do person. 1 Just as poor persons are not permitted to
sell their children to meet their financial needs, 2 perhaps they
should also be prohibited from contracting to use their bodies to
produce a child for someone else.
Similarly, our laws against prostitution prohibit women
from selling their bodies in exchange for money-partly to protect against their exploitation, partly to defend a concept of a
society where sex is sufficiently personal that it is not available
for hire." With respect to all of these arrangements-prostitu30. Some contracts provide for partial payment in the event of miscarriage. 60 Minutes, CBS, Sept. 20, 1987.
31. It may not be in the interest of the particularchild to prevent this arrangement
(depending on the characteristics of both the selling and the buying parents, and upon
the character of the child's relationship with her or his natural parents). It is in the
interest of children and families in general for the state to foster a sense of security
about them and to remove temptation by not allowing sales of family members for
money.
32. During the 18th and 19th centuries, poor French women "often sold not only
their bodies, but, as their charms began to fade, even their teeth-to be made into dentures for the wealthy elite." Rovner, supra note 4, at 15.
Today an issue somewhat analogous to surrogacy is often discussed as a possibility-persons selling organs that others vitally need, like a kidney, for an enormous fee.
Often in discussions of surrogacy, persons pose the question whether such sales of organs
should be allowed, encouraged, or outlawed. While certain analogies with surrogacy obviously exist, including the ethics of having such a practice that is available only to the
wealthy, one might find more of an affirmative state interest in allowing the sale of organs, since presumably it makes possible life for someone who is already in existence.
While there is a state interest in preserving lives in being, there is no similar interest at
this point in time in encouraging more births.
The American Fertility Society has taken the position that surrogacy should be seen
as rent (for the womb) in order to get around the rule "that the purchasing of organs. . .is inappropriate because of the potential for abuse." Ethics Committe, supra
note 11, at 67S. While the womb may be rented, however, the egg surely is sold.
33. With prostitution, our society has made the same judgment that it has with
babyselling-that it should not be allowed-at least in theory, although enforcement
here is substantially unsuccessful, and prostitution, unlike babyselling, remains very
common. See generally Baby Selling supra note 4; see also Erbe, Prostitutes: Victims of
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tion, childselling, and surrogate motherhood-there is a similar
issue of whether it is not too protectionist to use the law to prohibit such arrangements, when the arrangements are satisfactory
to the persons who enter them. Why should women not be allowed to use their bodies-or sell their children-to make
money rather than engage in other work, if that is what they
want?3" It is patronizing to women, and dangerous to their
rights, for government or society to consider it its role to protect
them from doing what they want to do. 5
On the other hand, there may be some types of things that
we as a society do not want to have measured in terms of money.
Society may want to do what it can to help others to keep these
in a personal sphere that is distinct from the commercial; indeed
it may even force them to do so, to the extent that it can. On
this basis one can see the grounds for an argument that surrogate motherhood contracts should be illegal, just as prostitution
and babyselling are, although reasonable persons would disagree
about just how compelling such an argument is.
On the issue of whether surrogacy is to be prohibited, John
and Diane would argue that any harm is sufficiently speculative,
that any prohibition is sufficiently questionable in view of the
woman's own eagerness to enter into the arrangement, and that
arguments for prohibition do not outweigh the obvious benefit
that the arrangement provides. For there is a clear benefit to
John and Diane from the arrangement, and to other couples like
them, who may not be able to obtain a baby, and surely will not
be able to obtain a baby with whom they have any biological
connection, without a surrogate motherhood arrangement.
Men's Exploitation and Abuse, 2 L. AND INEQUALITY 609, 624-25 (1984). While proposals
to legalize prostitution have been presented to many legislatures, laws against child selling have not been the subject of decriminalization attempts. Id. Erbe, supra.
One surrogate mother recounts that a woman in her congregation labeled her "a
high-class hooker." Her response: "Mary was a surrogate for God." Kantrowitz, supra
note 4, at 46 (quoting Jenny Cassem, a 28-year-old California mother of five). Cf.
Rushevsky, supra note 4, at 112 n.39 (claiming prostitution is unlike surrogacy because
of an absence of immorality in surrogacy arrangements).
34. "The right to be a prostitute is as important as the right not to be one. It is
essentially the right to set the terms of one's own sexuality, plus the right to earn a good
living." Griffin, Wives, Hookers, and the Law, 10 STUDENT LAWYER 13, 7 (1982).
35. On this theory, a National Association of Surrogate Mothers has been formed to
promote surrogate motherhood and to protect their right to play that role. See N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 1986.
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If surrogacy were prohibited, criminal penalties might attach to parties who entered into them. At any rate, a court
would not enforce the contracts even when both parties were
ready and willing to perform.s
B. Are Surrogacy Contracts ConstitutionallyProtected?
At the other extreme from being illegal, are surrogate motherhood contracts constitutionally protected, so that the state
must allow them to be made and must lend its enforcement
mechanisms to them at least on a par with other contracts? An
extreme version of John and Diane's argument would maintain
that any state interference with their surrogacy arrangement is
unconstitutional. The right to procreate is a "fundamental
right" protected by the United States Constitution. John, or
John and Diane, are exercising this right in the principal way
available to them, given her infertility.
A common form of this argument is that the state denies
John, or John and Diane, equal protection of the laws in viola36. For example, a Kentucky court in In re Baby Girl, 9 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2348
(Ky. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 1983), denied a petition that would allow a surrogate mother and
her husband to terminate their parental rights, establish the alleged biological father's
paternity, and transfer legal custody of a child to her biological father.
And in England, couples who have arranged for the pregnancy of a surrogate mother
and agreed to adopt the child have had difficulty obtaining custody of the child from the
English courts even when the surrogate mother is ready and eager to complete the transaction. In one recent case, for example, local authorities obtained a "plan of safety order" to assume state protective custody over a child born to a surrogate mother a few
hours after the birth in London, and before the child was handed over to the biological
father. The biological father, an American who had arranged through an agency in the
United States for the conception of the child, had to commence wardship proceedings to
obtain custody. The surrogate mother took no part in the proceedings. The court granted
the biological father's motion for wardship, finding that the biological father and his wife
"are devoted to each other ... are both professional people, highly qualified . . . [with]
a very nice home in the country and another in town. . . [and] are both excellently
equipped to meet the baby's emotional needs." See In re C, 1985 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
846. Earlier, the Warnock Commission in England had recommended that surrogacy be
prohibited, see Warnock Report, supra note 11. After this case, and partly in reaction to
Americans arranging such contracts, commercial surrogacy was banned in Britain. It is
now a criminal offense to broker surrogacy contracts, punishable by imprisonment. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49. See Krautheimer, supra note 2, at 19. See also
Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983) rev'd 420 Mich. 367,
362 N.W.2d 211 (1985) (the trial court and the appeals court were prepared to utilize
existing laws to prevent execution of surrogacy arrangements that all parties were ready
to perform, but the Michigan Supreme Court reversed).
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tion of the fourteenth amendment when it does not allow them
to reproduce through a surrogacy arrangement. Equal protection
doctrine provides that the state may not draw arbitrary distinctions between persons who are similarly situated, and requires
substantial reasons for any such distinction that interferes with
persons' fundamental rights.
John and Diane might contend that it is discriminatory to
prohibit surrogacy and thereby limit having children, at least
children to whom they are biologically connected, to couples who
can have children naturally. The argument that the state has
drawn an arbitrary line between couples it will permit to have
children is difficult to sustain, partly because it is not the action
of the state that has made Diane infertile. In one sense, the state
has one rule for all: that all can have children naturally but not
for hire, and that rule is probably not vulnerable as a matter of
equal protection. Even though Diane and John are hurt by that
rule, it is not unreasonable for the state to distinguish between
pregnancy achieved naturally and pregnancy for hire, if they are
substantially different things.
A more common equal protection argument attacks antisurrogacy legislation because it treats even couples who are infertile
differently from each other. The state allows couples in which
the man is unable to reproduce to have the biological child of
one of them through artificial insemination. Since that couple
can arrange to have a baby to whom the mother is biologically
connected, it violates equal protection, the argument runs, for
the state to prohibit an arrangement whereby a couple could
have the father's biological child when it is the wife who is
infertile.
The problem with this argument too is that what one kind
of infertile couple must do to obtain the child they desire is significantly different from what the other type of couple must do.
The state would not be preventing the couple from arranging to
have the child of the father because of any purpose of interfering with their ability to have a child, but rather because of the
burden such an arrangement places upon the surrogate mother.
It is reasonable for the state to differentiate between surrogacy
and artificial insemination in this respect because so much more
is required of the surrogate mother than is required of the se-
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men donor.8 7 While the surrogate mother must be inseminated,
artificially or naturally, become pregnant, bear the child for nine
months and undergo labor and delivery, all the semen donor
must do is masturbate and ejaculate into a clean container and
hand over his sperm. The sperm donor will typically not even
know whether his donation resulted in offspring or not. The differing burdens on the sperm donor and the surrogate mother are
reflected also in the amount of consideration usually paid: While
the surrogate mother's recompense is generally in the thousands
of dollars, the semen donor would receive $50 or $100 for one
specimen.38

This difference gives the state adequate reason to distinguish between artificial insemination and surrogacy, even though
the resulting rule harms couples where the wife is infertile much
more than couples where the husband is. A judge need not agree
with a distinction to find it constitutionally valid. The judge
need only believe that reasonable persons could make the judgment. One may reasonably believe that as a matter of policy the
correct course is to make surrogacy arrangements available to
couples who need them, but it is extremely difficult to sustain an
argument that the opposite course would violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 9
One can make what is essentially the same argument
through use of the due process clause. The due process clause, as
it has been interpreted during the past thirty years, 0 protects
37. A closer comparison would be between a male sperm donor and a female eggdonor, although that comparison is also tenuous, as the process of donating an egg is
much more intrusive than the giving of sperm. In egg donation, an oocyte is removed
through a surgical technique in which the immature eggs are drawn out through a hollow
needle inserted into the patient's abdomen. See Saltarelli, Genesis Retold: Legal Issues
Raised by the Cryopreservation of PreimplantationHuman Embryos, 36 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1021, 1026-27 (1985).
38. It is true that there are some analogies between sperm donation and surrogate
motherhood, and that some of the same arguments can be made against them. Some
would argue, for example, that payment for sperm also constitutes commercialization of
procreation. One author recounts the story of a sperm donor who, learning that conception was accomplished by his sperm, refused to take a fee because to do so would make
him feel like a prostitute. W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 34 (1976).
39. The trial judge in Baby "M" did, however, rest in part on the equal protection
argument. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. at 387-89, 525 A.2d at 1165-66.
40. While one might question whether the due process clause is properly interpreted
as conferring substantive rights, it is likely that the fourteenth amendment was intended
to confer some such rights through its privileges and immunities clause. That provision
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the right to procreate, recognizes it as a right of considerable
importance, and would not allow the state to burden it unreasonably. The due process argument does not have to rely upon
the weak analogies to artificial insemination, or to couples who
have children naturally, that the equal protection argument requires, and hence the argument is a preferable one. While escaping those analogies, the due process argument incorporates the
same points that the right to procreate is very important to John
and Diane and that it is important that they have available this
means of exercising it. John and Diane must also maintain in
order to succeed, that the state does not have good reasons for
prohibiting surrogacy contracts, which are entered into between
willing parties.
The chief difficulty that the couple will have in prevailing
with the due process argument is in showing that the state's reasons for prohibiting surrogacy are so insubstantial in comparison
to the importance of the right to John and Diane and others like
them, that the state should not be permitted to prohibit the arrangement, even if its legislature so desires. In any event, the
factors to be weighed in a due process analysis are the same as
when a policy choice is being made in the first instance. The
ultimate questions are: whether the arrangement does real harm;
whether it is the kind of harm the state should or is entitled to
protect against; and whether the harm outweighs the needs of
persons like John and Diane.
The same questions then control, whether we think of the
issue in constitutional terms or simply ask what a judge should
decide in the absence of legislative guidance, or what a legislature should decide concerning the legality of the contracts. The
main differences between the constitutional framework and the
of the fourteenth amendment was rendered meaningless however when the Supreme
Court, which was hostile to the new amendment, first construed that provision in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); the subsequent interpretation of
the due process clause, and later the equal protection clause, to perform the function
originally intended for the privileges and immunities clause may be justified on the basis
that it respects the original understanding of the amendment, if not of the particular
clause.
In any event, the ninth amendment to the Constitution might be deemed to protect
the right to procreate. It is likely that having children is a right that the Framers considered important and basic and one that they supposed would not be taken from the people by government.
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others are: (1) if the courts decide that due process protects
John's, or John and Diane's, right to enter into this kind of contract, the courts' view will prevail no matter what the state legislature does-even if it enacts an explicit statute to the contrary;
and (2) accordingly, the benefits-harms balance must be much
clearer to sustain the ruling if it is to be based on the Constitution than if it is to be decided simply as a matter of policy. A
judge who thought it was a close question whether the harms of
surrogacy arrangements outweigh the needs for and benefits of
such arrangements, might find as a matter of common law, or
interpretation of existing legislative provisions, that such arrangements were permissible, but she or he would not find that
a clear legislative declaration prohibiting such arrangements was
unconstitutional. The judge would need much greater certainty
concerning the unreasonableness of the burden on persons like
John and Diane in order to rest the decision on constitutional
grounds.
At any rate, whether we are looking at reasonableness under
the due process clause or what a lawmaking body should opt for
as a matter of policy, it is necessary to inquire whether there are
other elements as well that should be weighed in the harms-benefits balance. Besides the interests of the parties to the contract,
the interests of the child might seem very important. In fact
those interests would be dominant if they were coherent and ascertainable. In a sense, the agreements are certainly in the
child's interest because it is the agreement that produces the
child; in a sense, it gives the particular child the opportunity for
life. But this interest is not really relevant because when the
contract is entered, the child has yet to be conceived. From that
perspective, there is no child's interest to protect.
Moreover, from the perspective of the child who has been
born, whether it would be best to remain with the surrogate
mother varies with the facts and circumstances of the case. The
rule best serving the child's interest is a rule that discourages
custody contests; probably the way best to achieve this objective
is by adopting a clear rule stating a strong presumption for one
parent or the other. Beyond the desirability of avoiding litigation, it would be hard to generalize which parents would best
suit the child.
Besides the interests of the parties which we have discussed,

1987]

THE LEGAL ISSUES

societal reasons could play a role. But we in this country, now at
least, are not suffering from inadequate population; as a society
we do not need more babies. There are no affirmative reasons for
the state to promote surrogacy arrangements other than to fulfill
the wishes of persons like John and Diane. Fulfilling their wishes
could be a sufficient reason, of course, depending upon the
strength of their interest and upon the balance with the other
interests at issue.
One possible argument against allowing surrogate motherhood is that the availability of that arrangement would cut back
on the adoption of existing babies. Perhaps if John and Diane
and others like them were unable to employ a surrogate to have
a child for them, they would go about getting a child in some
other way-and in a way that would be much more beneficial to
society. They might decide to adopt a child already in existence,
or a child who will be born in any event, and who is in need of a
home. Fulfilling their parental urges in that way, they would
perform an important service to the child and to society.
It is true that adoption is not as easy today as it has been in
the past and that there is a definite shortage of healthy
newborns available for adoption in this country, especially
healthy white newborns."' But there are some babies needing to
be adopted, born in this country as well as elsewhere."2 Moreover, there is available in this country a supply of children with
special needs4 3 who could benefit enormously from being taken
41. See

ADOPTION FACTBOOK,

supra note 4, at 102.

42. At times it has appeared that there were not available in this country newborn
infants of any race, but recent reports suggest that in some cities black newborns have
been abandoned by their natural parents and are languishing unclaimed without the
prospect of adoptive parents. Moreover, there are babies available in other countries, and
many couples or would-be single parents who have not been successful with adoption
agencies here have managed to obtain a newborn from abroad. ADOPTION FACTHOOK,
supra note 4, at 28 (intercountry adoption is rapidly increasing, and in 1984 over eight
thousand foreign born children were placed in this country). Ellis, The Law and Procedure of International Adoption: An Overview, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 361 (1983)
(since 1976, an average of 5000 children per year have entered the United States as immigrant orphans. Id. at 361 n.1). See Bolick, The Adoption Option, THE BOSTON MAGAZINE, Oct. 1986, at 152.
43. Based on statistics from 1982, healthy infants comprise about one-third of all
unrelated adoptions, and that figure includes some adoptions of healthy infants from
other countries. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 4, at 102. The National Committee on
Adoption then qualifies their statistics by calling them a "minimum" or "conservative"
estimate. Id. at 103.
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into a family, and who have been adopted in greater numbers as
the supply of "normal" babies has dwindled. Of course, many
couples who would like to have a child would not be prepared as
an alternative to take on a special needs child. Nonetheless, society might make a judgment that some such couples would make
that choice, thereby benefitting both children in need and society. Accordingly, a state might decide that it is best for couples
like John and Diane not to be permitted to create another baby
by contract, when at least a few of those couples otherwise might
decide to take on a child in need."
John and Diane would argue that the chance to have a "normal" child, and to have a child as biologically connected to them
as possible, is not afforded by the possiblility of special needs
adoption, or even adoption of healthy newborns. And while it
may be more socially beneficial to adopt an existing child than
to conceive a new one, the same is true for fertile couples, who
nonetheless can reproduce without any restriction by the state.
And so we come back to the same arguments and balancing
judgments that we have seen already in the policy debate and
the constitutional debate. The state, if it wants to uphold the
prohibition, must contend that pregnancy for hire is sufficiently
distinct from other pregnancy that it need not be treated the
same.4 5 John and Diane, in support of surrogacy arrangements,
44. There is also concern that allowing surrogacy would result in the widespread selling of unwanted babies that would otherwise be available for adoption. See N.Y. Times,
Feb. 24, 1987, at B2, col. 1 (quoting National Committee for Adoption).
45. Perhaps we are temporally in the midst of a shift; we may soon move to a time
when it does not seem valid to distinguish between pregnancy by natural parents and
pregnancy for hire and the litigation to determine whether or not surrogacy agreements
should be respected may be an important step in this development. That norms are
changing is apparent. A few years ago the debatable issue instead of surrogacy would
have been whether it is qualitatively different for a state to allow and encourage childbirth for persons who are married but not for others, or whether equal protection requires that the married and unmarried be treated alike for these purposes. By now it is
fairly well established that unwed parenthood is constitutionally protected against discrimination, under the equal protection and due process clauses. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.") (emphasis in original). Cord v. Gibb, 219 Va. 1019, 254 S.E. 2d 711 (1979); Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976). But see Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie
Free Library, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, (with dissenting opinions), 439
U.S. 1052 (1978).

1987]

THE LEGAL ISSUES

must argue that the state should not deprive them of the way
they can most closely approximate what others do without any
limit or regulation: having a child or children with their own biology. In order for the state to prohibit this, there should have
to be some real and discernible evil, which has not been demonstrated here.
A final factor that could play a part in the benefits-harms
balance concerns the effects of prohibition. Any legislation
prohibiting surrogacy would not altogether stamp out the practice. If a state wanted to regulate surrogacy-for example by licensing the mothers and screening them to determine such
things as their motivation and psychological stability or to predict whether they would be willing ultimately to surrender the
child or by regulating the amount of compensation 4 -then it
would seem unwise to prohibit surrogacy and thereby drive it
underground. On the other hand, it is difficult to think of state
regulations that would sufficiently cut back on the difficulties of
the unregulated system. If there were not particular regulations
that it seemed useful and important to enforce, 7 then it might
be worth criminalizing (or otherwise prohibiting) surrogacy,
since it is clear that a prohibition of surrogacy would reduce its
incidence, it would keep at least some arrangements from occurring. ' The current situation of persons coming to see surrogacy
46. But which is preferable-high compensation or low compensation?
Occasionally it is suggested that the state should regulate surrogacy contracts by
prohibiting any payment at all for them (other than out-of-pocket costs like medical
expenses). See supra note 16. 1 agree that even if surrogacy-for-money were illegal it
might seem proper to allow surrogacy by volunteers. Making the contract they enter
enforceable is another question, however. See supra note 26.
Most proponents of surrogacy would view surrogacy-for-hire as what they are fighting for and would consider a prohibition of payment as substantially equivalent to a
prohibition of surrogacy.
47. Some of the factors for screening discussed above, in particular regulations concerning the health of the mother and predictions of her willingness to go through with
the arrangement, occur even in the absence of state regulation, since it is in the interest
of the contracting couple to satisfy themselves in these regards to the greatest extent
possible.
One kind of regulation that the state might enforce, and that adopting couples
might not, is rules concerning the permissible age for surrogate motherhood. Even if a
state were to allow surrogacy, it might prohibit teenage women from becoming surrogates-or even women under the age of 25, for example.
48. The degree to which surrogacy would be reduced would vary with the stringency
of any sanctions and with the extent of efforts to detect the existence of the arrangements that persisted. But no matter how vigorous the enforcement, it seems likely that
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as the easy solution to the infertility-adoption problem, by contrast, encourages more and more persons to try this solution
rather than other possibilities. A state could reasonably find that
even though it could not eradicate surrogacy arrangements, cutting back on them was a sufficient reason to make the contracts
illegal.
So far we have been discussing whether or not states should
make illegal surrogate motherhood contracts for compensation,
either under existing legislation prohibiting babyselling, or
under new legislation aimed at surrogacy. To criminalize surrogacy contracts, or otherwise make them illegal, is a solution to
the problem at one end of the spectrum of possibilities. A jurisdiction should adopt this solution if it believed it clear that the
contracts were more harmful than beneficial and if it was not
concerned with driving underground those surrogate arrangements that would continue to be made, because it had no particular regulation it wanted to impose upon the contracts anyway.
C.

Are Surrogacy Contracts Enforceable?

At the other end of the spectrum, a legislature or judge
might believe that surrogacy contracts should be enforceable like
any other contract. This is the view of surrogacy contracts that
apparently is most prevalent among laypersons in our country
today,'" and in our hypothetical, that John and Diane would
prefer and that Mary must argue against. But there is a middle
position-that the contracts are unenforceable, at least by specific performance.
some surrogacy arrangements would remain.
Another effect of prohibiting surrogacy would likely be to increase the price of the
surrogacy arrangements that would remain.
49. See Newsweek Poll, supra note 3. The Poll asked respondents "who should get

custody of Baby M-the natural mother or the couple who paid her to have the baby?"
Of all women polled: 61% thought that custody should be granted to the couple who
paid to have the baby; 22% thought that custody should be granted to the natural
mother; and 17% did not know who should get custody. Of all men polled: 58% thought
that custody should be granted to the couple who paid to have the baby; 28% thought
that custody should be granted to the natural mother; and 14% did not know who
should get custody.
Similarly, a survey of television viewers produced a 70% response that "a contract is
a contract" and that the adopting couple should receive custody rather than a surrogate
mother who changed her mind at birth. Miller's Court (channel 5, Boston, television
broadcast, Feb. 22, 1978).
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It is important to distinguish between the possibility of
criminalizing or otherwise prohibiting surrogate motherhood
contracts and another possible solution of simply not enforcing
them over the surrogate mother's objection. Under this middle
position, if parties enter into a surrogacy arrangement and all
parties remain willing to go through with the arrangement, then
there is no legal barrier to its performance; the state will not
interfere with this arrangement between willing parties. But if
the mother changes her mind about parting with her child, the
state will not put its force behind the agreement, and her baby
will not be removed from her because of a document that she
signed before the baby was conceived.5 0
This paper takes the position that if surrogacy arrangements are not to be illegal as a matter of public policy, then
rather than treating surrogacy contracts just like any other contract, the law should make the arrangement performable or not
at the option of the mother. The justifications for such a position bear some similarity to the arguments for illegality, but in
this context they are even stronger. The argument for unenforceability relies upon the same special role of procreation and
other things in a sphere of personal and fundamental rights.
There are some things so visceral and personal that one should
not judge a person's positions on them, or change of position, by
the same yardstick of rational agreement as bargains made in
the workplace, and having a baby is one of those things.5 1
Our laws concerning prostitution and childselling show we
consider sex and the rearing of one's children also to be in the
same realm where we as a society would like to maintain a line
between the commercial and the personal: even if a state decided to decriminalize prostitution, we would not expect it to
enforce contracts to engage in prostitution when the prostitute
had changed her mind. 2 Nor would it enforce contracts to sell
babies over the objections of the natural parents. 5
50. In our hypothetical this position would be favorable to Mary but not to John and
Diane.
51. See O'Brien, supra note 4, at 150 ("A court will decline...to direct specific performance when an order to perform-to deliver over the child to the contracting
couple-would introduce compulsion into close personal relationships.").
52. This example, but not the childselling one, is explainable under the standard contract doctrine that personal service contracts are unenforceable. See supra note 14.
53. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (courts should refuse to enforce pri-

506

HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL

[Vol. IV

Indeed even contracts to marry are not specifically enforceaA promise to marry may be as certain and explicit as a
promise to be a surrogate; there may exist at least as great expectations and disappointment if one of the parties has a change
of mind. Yet it seems unimaginable today for the law to award
specific performance, largely because this is an area society
wishes to maintain as a personal one.5 5 Similarly it seems
unimaginable that the law would enforce a contract to undergo
an abortion, an area in which the Constitution gives the mother
a right to choose;56 instead the right would be held to be inalienble. " '

vately negotiated racially restrictive covenants, leaving such covenants to stand when all
parties to a transaction agree to them but leaving them unenforceable against any party
who disagrees). By analogy, even if a jurisdiction does not decide to make surrogacy
arrangements illegal in order to enforce society's sentiments on the commercialization of
baby producing, that does not mean that it has to or should enforce surrogacy contracts.
54. At times actions for breach of promise to marry have been enforceable, first as a
tort and then as a contract, but they were only enforceable by actions for damages and
not by specific performance. Specific performance was not available, even though the
breach of promise action was seen as vindicating an important social policy, and not
simply the private interests of the parties. See generally S. GREEN & J.V. LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS §§ 2.02-.03 (1984) [hereinafter GREEN & LONG] in
which the authors state:
A basic argument in support of the action is related to society's interest in the
preservation of marriage, that '[t]he law is justified in enforcing performance of
the contract because on its faithful performance the interest of society depends
more than upon the faithful performance of any other type of contract.'
Id. (citation omitted). It is difficult to sustain any similar argument concerning the preservation of the right to hire a surrogate.
55. Some states today apparently retain actions for breach of promise to marry, but
they are never specifically enforceable. Indeed even damage actions are rare in those
jurisdictions that still seemingly allow them. By the 1930s, most states had abolished or
sharply limited breach of promise actions, but Illinois still retains a statute allowing it,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1801-1810 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (limiting damages to actual damages and eliminating recompense for mental or emotional distress), and at least seven
states (Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington) retain a common law action for breach of the promise to marry. See GREEN & LONG, supra
note 51, at § 2.03 nn.29-39. Therefore, "[allthough the breach of promise action is an
ancient one, not frequently filed today and probably overlooked, the theory that every
wrong deserves a remedy and the ingenuity of lawyers in fashioning new and recycled
causes of action and defenses" explains the fact that, especially in the cohabitation context, the breach of the promise to marry action has not completely disappeared. Id. at §
2.03.
56. Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a state's requirement that a woman can obtain an abortion only with the consent
of her spouse). If a woman can waive her right to choose about abortion in a contract,
then why doesn't her marriage contract with her husband constitute an agreement not to
abort their fetus without his consent, at least when a state by statute so provides? Even
an explicit antenuptial contract in which the wife-to-be agrees to share the abortion deci-
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able,57 and she could not give up the right to make her own
decision.5
This is not to say that the state can, or should strive to,
maintain some absolute line between the personal and the commercial. One can marry for money. Or a couple may decide not
to have an additional child because they cannot afford it. But
the line between natural pregnancy and pregnancy for hire is
sufficiently distinct and sufficiently reasonable for a state to be
permitted to use it if it makes a judgment that it wants to use it
in attempting to delineate a personal sphere that is separate
from the commercial one.
Even in areas other than the personal, it is not foreign to
contract law for contracts to be enforceable or not at the option
of one of the parties. The Restatement of Contracts recognizes
voidable contracts,59 contracts that are unenforceable as against
public policy,"0 and option contracts6 l as valid contracts in
which one of the parties has the right to decide whether to proceed. 2 Unilateral contracts in traditional contract law may or
may not be performed at the option of one party.63 The law's
sion with her husband would probably not be enforced against her wishes.
57. See Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 986 n.101 (1982) (noting the distinction between "inalienability rules" and "property rules").
58. Sometimes surrogacy contracts do contain a provision either committing a woman
not to obtain an abortion, or committing her to obtain an abortion in certain circumstances. In the Baby "M" case, for example, the contract provided that Mary Beth
Whitehead would undergo amniocentesis, and if the results indicated genetic abnormalities, an abortion would be performed if the natural father requested it. In re Baby "M",
217 N.J. Super. at 345, 525 A.2d at 1143.
It does not seem likely that a court would enforce any such restriction upon the
woman's right to choose, and the trial court in Baby "M" held the provision unenforceable. It would be most uncomfortable to allow the father in a surrogacy situation to
obtain greater rights by contract and by the payment of money than a husband has, or
would be permitted to acquire by agreement with his wife, even if he is prepared to raise
the child himself.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981).
60. Id. at §§ 8, 178-79.
61. Id. at §§ 25, 45, 87.
62. Id. at § 78, 79.
63. CORBIN, supra note 14, §§ 21, 152, 157. In traditional nomenclature, a contract is
unilateral as opposed to bilateral if a promise is given in exchange for an actual performance by the other party instead of in exchange for a promise. Classic examples of
unilateral contracts, which the second Restatement calls acceptable only by performance,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 30, 32, are "If you walk across Brooklyn Bridge,
I'll pay you $30," or "If you paint my house, I'll pay you $1000."
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recognition of one party's power to decide whether or not to perform rests sometimes on the parties' intent to create such an
option, as for example in the case of unilateral contracts where
an offer is acceptable only by performance and at the option of
the offeree; accordingly they are not directly helpful to the surrogacy example, where both parties promised to perform and
seemingly expected those promises to be mutually binding."'
With respect to voidable contracts and contracts that are
unenforceable as against public policy, however, the option to
avoid the agreement is imposed on grounds of policy independent of the agreement. Well known categories of voidable contracts are those induced by fraud, mistake, or duress, or those
where one party is an infant. But even apart from such categories, a contract can be unenforceable or voidable on grounds of
public policy that the court derives either from relevant legislation or from "the need to protect some aspect of the public
welfare.""
Sometimes a case is made that surrogacy contracts should
be voidable on grounds of mistake (because in the particular
case the mother did not understand the extent of the attachment she would form to the child she carried) or duress (because
of the particular mother's modest financial circumstances, for
example), but a better approach would be to consider surrogacy
contracts in general voidable for reasons of public policy such as
those discussed above.6 6 Under this analysis public policy considerations would render all surrogacy contracts performable or
not at the option of the mother. Only if the surrogate did perform, and turned the child over to the father, would the contract
terms be given effect.
In addition to a characterization of the contract that would
64. If the approach I suggest were followed, however, and surrogacy contracts were
made voidable, parties would come to know that surrogacy contracts were not mutually
enforceable, and the option would more frequently reflect the contracting parties' intent.
In those circumstances, the unilateral contract characterization, or the characterization
as an offer intended to be acceptable only by performance, would become more appropriate. See also infra note 90.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 (1981). One example the Restatement gives is "judicial policies against ... impairment of family relations.
Id. subsection (b).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 27-36, 41-44 and note 26 and accompanying
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allow it to be performed or not at the option of one party, doctrines associated with the remedy of specific performance could
have the same effect. Specific performance is discretionary with
the court6 7 and it may not be ordered when it seems unfair, creates unreasonable hardship, or when the bargain reflects an inadequate exchange, 66 or when it is in violation of public policy.69
In addition to law in arguably analogous areas where contracts are or would be considered unenforceable, or unenforceable by specific performance, the law of adoption could quite directly support an argument that the mother cannot commit
herself to part with her baby before the baby is born (let alone
before the baby is conceived!). Adoption differs from surrogacy
arrangements in two obvious respects: (1) the mother has already become pregnant (usually unintentionally) by the time
any issue of adoption presents itself; and (2) the baby as a rule
does not have any biological connection to the father of the
adopting couple.7 0
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1981).
68. Id. at § 364.
69. Id. at § 365.
70. One suggestion occasionally made for regulating surrogate motherhood contracts
relies on removing the biological connection; it would allow sperm banks to perform
"surrogacy arrangements" in which couples could arrange for others to have a child for
them but one that was not biologically related to them. This alteration of our current
surrogacy scheme would greatly lessen legal complications that currently accompany surrogacy; it would be much clearer that the woman bearing the child could change her
mind.
Such a change would, 'however, also remove one of the distinctive features of the
typical surrogacy arrangement that makes it most appealing to most of the couples who
now enter into it. Just as the father can argue that surrogacy arrangements should not be
prohibited because of their importance to him (and his wife) in allowing them to come as
close as they can to having a child in the way that fertile couples do, he could also argue
that it hurts his (and his wife's) interests to remove the possibility of having a child of
his own biology. Indeed it is having a child with his own biology that makes the surrogacy arrangement more attractive to them than any other ways that may be available of
obtaining a newborn child.
One would suspect that couples desiring to utilize surrogate motherhood arrangements would far prefer a rule that the arrangement would fall through if the mother
changed her mind before or at birth, than a rule that the husband's sperm could not be
used to inseminate her. In the first instance, the couple would protect itself as best it
could by attempting to select a mother (either personally or through a lawyer or agency)
who seemed happy with the arrangement and unlikely to change her mind. In the latter
situation, there would be no way that the couple could legally use the arrangement to
obtain a child who shared the biology of the father.
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SURROGACY AND LAWS GOVERNING ADOPTION

In an adoption situation, states generally in this country do
not bind a mother to give up her child because of a consent to
adoption or a contract with prospective adoptive parents that
was executed before the child was born." Different states pursue
this policy of reserving the natural mother's rights in different
ways: some have statutes expressly prohibiting a parent from executing enforceable prebirth consent to adoption; 2 others have
accomplished the same result by judicial decision . But the effect is the same, and if this policy were carried over to surrogacy
arrangements, it would effectively support the surrogate
mother's right to decide whether or not to keep her child after
the child is born.
Surrogacy arrangements are sufficiently similar to other
adoption arrangements that the same rule should apply. In the
adoption context, allowing the mother to change her mind can
result in great disappointment for the would-be adopters. Of
course, if no couple has yet been selected as the parents who
would adopt, there is no problem of shattered expectations. Increasingly in this country, however, adoption is not being arranged through agencies, where even those who eventually succeed in obtaining a healthy newborn often have waited for four
71. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 4, at 76-85. That source lists the State of Washington as an exception. Id. at 85.
72. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-107 (1986-87) (A consent given before seventy-two hours after the birth of the child is invalid.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082 (West
1985) (The consent shall be executed only after the birth of the child.); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.500 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986) (No consent for adoption shall be held valid
if given prior to the fifth day after the birth of the child.); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 210, § 2
(West 1986) (Written consent shall be executed no sooner than the fourth calendar day
after the date of birth of the child to be adopted.); NEv. REv. STAT. § 127.070 (1986) (All
releases for and consents to adoption executed by the mother before the birth of a child
are invalid.); VA. CODE § 63.1-225 (1986) (The consent of a parent for the adoption of his
or her child placed directly by the parent shall not be valid unless the child is at least
ten days old at the time the parental consent is signed).
73. Some, for example, construe the act of adoption necessarily to imply the existence of a child to adopt. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 439 N.Y.S.2d 255, 260
(1981); In re Adoption of R.A.B., 426 So.2d 1203, 1205 (Fla. App. 1983); Korbin v. Ginsberg, 232 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1970)("[Adoption] is a personal relationship created between one capable of adopting and one capable of being adopted, and it necessarily requires that both the adopting parent and the adopted child be living at the time such
relationship comes into being by judicial decree."); In re Adoption of Kreuger, 448 P.2d
82, 86 (Ariz. 1969).
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or five years.74 Instead, persons increasingly are turning to private placements.7 5
Private placements can occur a number of different ways
but a common pattern is for the couple who wants to adopt to
meet the birth mother prior to the birth of the child. A private
adoption can be initiated by either the birth mother or the
adopting couple themselves-through advertising, for example-or either of the parties may turn to a private adoption service which specializes in bringing together pregnant women unable to keep their baby and couples who want to adopt. Either
way, the birth mother herself often selects the couple who will
adopt-based upon photographs and write-ups or upon personal
interviews. (Indeed, one of the attractions of the arrangement
for the mother may be that she feels less guilt at abandoning her
offspring when she participates in selecting a loving home.) And
in a great many cases, the adopting couple get to know the woman who is to bear their child, eagerly await her due date, and
even participate in the delivery as her labor coach.
Like John and Diane, the couples who arrange for private
adoption of a baby who has not yet been born have usually tried
74. Adoption and Foster Care, 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Children &
Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975)
(three to seven year waiting period); Frontline,supra note 4 (three to seven years). Some
commentators suggest that the long waiting period results from adoption agencies charging below market price for their services. See Landes & Posner, The Economics of the
Baby Shortage, 7 J. L. STUD. 323, 326 (1978).
75. Private placements or independent adoptions are illegal in many jurisdictions, for
example, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island,
Virginia, and others. See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 4, at 76-85. Other jurisdictions
disfavor private placements. See infra note 87. Even so, private placements comprise a
substantial percentage of all adoptions nationally. In 1982, of the 50,720 unrelated adoptions that took place, 19,428 were arranged by public agencies, 14,549 were arranged by
private agencies, and 16,743 were arranged by individuals. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra
note 4, at 102. Private for-profit agencies are also illegal in California, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah and others. Id. at 76-85.
In California, eighty per cent of all adoptions are private adoptions. Frontline, supra
note 4 (discussing private adoptions in California and focusing particularly on one private adoption agency run by Mark and Bonnie Gradstein).
Where private placement is prohibited, it still is often allowed between relatives. For
example, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan and Minnesota all
prohibit private placement by natural parents, except in the case of family placement
within the third degree of kinship. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 4, at 76-85. See also
MEEZAN, KATZ

& Russo, supra note 4, at 165-66.
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for some time to have a child of their own, and then have tried
to adopt by other means. After they are selected as the adopters-to-be, they become very emotionally invested in the offspring
they are expecting. If the birth mother changes her mind and
does not give them the baby after all, they experience severe disappointment and grief.
Sometimes the private adopters, like those in a surrogacy
situation, have also invested money because of the promise of a
child. While it is forbidden to pay for a child, it is generally permissible to underwrite the birth mother's expenses, and in some
jurisdictions the living expenses during pregnancy are includible
as well as strictly medical expenses; if so, a substantial sum may
be involved.70
Yet all recognize the right of the birth mother to undergo a
change of heart. The expectant adopters very much hope it will
not occur, and in the vast majority of cases the birth mother
carries through her plan to place her baby for adoption, just as
the vast majority of surrogate mothers give up their child without resisting their agreement. But if the mother does change her
mind, all the would-be adoptive couple can do is either give up
on becoming parents or try again.
It is true that the sensible and self-protective way for the
expectant adopters to behave throughout the pregnancy is to tell
76. The estimated cost of a typical adoption through this method is $25,000. Pierce,
supra note 4. As noted above, some statutes provide for the birth mother's living and
medical expenses. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(d) (West 1985) which states:
If a child is being adopted by a relative within the third degree or by a
stepparent, or is being adopted through the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, an agency, or an intermediary, nothing herein shall be construed
as prohibiting the person who is contemplating adopting the child from paying
the actual prenatal care and living expenses of the mother of the child to be
adopted, nor from paying the actual living and medical expenses of such mother
for a reasonable time, not to exceed 30 days, after the birth of the child.
Some states allow payment only for the birth mother's medical expenses and hospital
charges. See Taylor, Conceiving for Cash; Is it Legal?: A survey of the laws applicable to
surrogate motherhood, 4 N.Y.L.S. HuM. RTS. ANN. 413, 425 n.50 (1987). For a case holding that adoptive parents may not pay living expenses for 13 weeks before and 5 weeks
after birth, which totalled almost $8,000, see In re Adoption of Anonymous, 501
N.Y.S.2d 240 (1986)(construing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115(7)).
If, after giving birth, the birth mother changes her mind about turning over the
child, she is liable to repay any money that has been paid to her, Gordon v. Cutler, 471
A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. 1983). Situations will undoubtedly arise, however, where, the
mother's financial situation it makes it unrealistic to expect that the repayment will ever
be made.
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themselves that there is a chance that the adoption will not
work out and that they should not be too confident. In fact they,
like other couples, could lose the child through a mishap in pregnancy or at birth, as well as by the mother changing her mind
about keeping the child. But all this, of course, is easier said
than done. The couple are disappointed in very much the same
way that John and Diane are in our hypothetical. And the position of the mother is very similar in one situation and the other.
Each woman may have had her medical expenses paid. Each
made an agreement, oral or written, to give up her child to particular parties at birth. Each one, when faced with the reality of
a pregnancy or a baby, has found herself unable to go through
with the agreement she made. Just as we recognize and respect
her change of heart in the situation where she arranged for
adoption after becoming pregnant, so we should respect that
same change of heart when she arranged before becoming pregnant to turn the baby over to a particular family.
The parallels between the plight of the would-be adopters
in the private adoption scenario and the situation of John and
Diane in our hypothetical case are obvious. In both situations
the adopting couple's expectations are severely disappointed. In
both they are left with the unhappy alternatives of trying a similar arrangement again or giving up their dreams of having a
child. The unrelated adopters know from the outset that their
arrangement will fall through if the mother changes her mind,
and I suggest that lawmakers 8 clearly place the adopters in the
surrogacy situation in the same position as other adopters; they
then would have the same knowledge that their arrangement
was dependent upon the continued acquiescence of the mother,
and they would have the same incentives to guard emotionally
against the mother's change of heart as well as other possible
mishaps.
Is the dilemma of the would-be adoptive couple considerably worse because the husband donated his sperm to produce
this child? The decisive question is whether the differences that
exist between John and Diane and the typical private adopters
77. Despite any contractual provision to the contrary, the mother could also decide to
have an abortion. See supra notes 56 & 58 and accompanying text.
78. These could either be legislators addressing the problem or judges interpreting
existing provisions of adoption and contract law.
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make it inappropriate to look to adoption law in the surrogacy
context. The basic difference, of course, is that John and Diane
have participated in the creation of the baby in question and
that the baby is linked biologically to John as well as to the surrogate mother. The father knows that the child he will not get
after all has his genes-the child is his biological son or daughter. If John does not gain custody, he will have the knowledge
that there is such a child in the world that he is prevented from
bringing up (just as the biological mother will if he does get
custody).79
Should these differences between the would-be adopters in
the surrogacy situation and the would-be adopters in a private
adoption situation call for different results? While they do distinguish John from the typical would-be adoptive father, I do
not believe that the differences from the ordinary private adoption situation are sufficient to sustain radically different rules
concerning whether a contract is enforceable against the mother.
If it is inappropriate in the private adoption context to make
binding an agreement to give up one's child for adoption that is
made before the child is born, then it is inappropriate in the
surrogacy context to make binding an agreement to give up one's
child for adoption that is made before the child is born or conceived. (This is not to say that the father's biological ties to the
child are irrelevant. As I will discuss they may be relevant in
other contexts-after he receives custody, for example, or after
the surrogate contract is put aside and he seeks to gain custody
on another basis.)
One sensible approach would allow the mother to change
her mind while she was pregnant, at birth, or before she turned
the baby over to the adopting couple. Once she turned over the
baby, however, she would have performed her part of the bargain and the contract would be complete and binding.
A rule that the natural mother is bound once the adopting
couple takes custody of the child is advantageous both to the
adopting couple and to the child. It is especially after the couple
has received the newborn baby and has started to care for her
79. The situation might be psychologically easier for the father because he knows
that it is not his fault that he is not his child's custodian. The biological mother who was
held to her contract might feel guilt that she ever agreed to give up her child.
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that they bond with her and experience her as a real daughter
and not simply as an idea. While it may be sensible to ask the
adopting couple to be prepared for the possibility that the adoption will fall through before they receive the child, it would be
destructive to ask them not to form a parent-child bond once
the baby is in their household; after all, a paramount aim of all
of this law is to provide for the child as loving and stable a home
as is possible, and the first year of the child's life is important to
the formation of the parent-child bond.
Moreover, it is best for a baby's custody not to be changed
back and forth, whether she is to live with her natural parent(s)
or with an adoptive family. It is in the best interests of the child
to have a clear rule as to who her proper custodian is and to
have a rule that prevents her from being transferred back and
forth between parties who disagree concerning their parental
rights.80 If the mother had a right to change her mind concerning whether she wanted to be the parent after the adopting
couple had taken custody of the baby, or if the rule for who was
the appropriate custodian was less clear than a rule turning on
whether the child had yet been surrendered for adoption, the
resultant conflicts could result in frequent transferrals back and
forth as a custody dispute wended its way through the state's
appellate system, a process that often takes a period of years.
The instability and uncertainty that would result would be destructive to the child as well as difficult for all of the parents
concerned.
Accordingly, there is a need for a clear cut-off to the natural
mother's right to claim her child, and there is much to be said
for choosing as the line the moment that the mother surrenders
the child to the physical custody of the adopting couple. Different rules of course would apply to involuntary surrenders-when, for example, a mother hands over her child under
court order. (This rule does not therefore directly decide the celebrated Baby "M" case.) A clear definition of the natural
mother's rights would prevent some involuntary surrenders from
occurring.
80. I am referring to situations where the child is shifted back and forth because
custody is not shared and no custody arrangement is agreed upon, and not to situations
of joint custody, where parents have agreed or courts have decreed that the parents
should share custody.
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If a jurisdiction was concerned that the mother have a period after birth in which to reflect upon her decision and feel
comfortable about it, then it could impose a waiting period after
the child's birth during which the mother cannot surrender the
child for adoption; various states have such a requirement, with
a waiting period ranging from 3 to 10 days.8 1 Whether with or
without a waiting period, a rule making the surrender of the
child to adopting parents the determinative event would give the
mother time to assess how she feels about adoption-during the
pregnancy and for a short time thereafter. A clear line might
help her to accept that when she parts with the baby the parting
is final, and that the intelligent thing for her to do at that point
is to direct her attention and energies elsewhere. Indeed many
parents who are certain they want to place their child for adoption decide to make it easiest for themselves by never seeing the
child after the child is born.2
The argument for this as the time for termination of the
natural mother's rights to rescind the contract applies equally in
the context of surrogacy and in the context where the mother
has decided to let another couple adopt because she cannot raise
her child. (It does not apply when the natural mother has turned
her baby over to an agency but the baby has not yet been placed
with a family for adoption; in that situation it makes sense for a
natural mother to have much greater discretion to change her
mind and herself provide a home for her baby; absent unfitness,
she should be able to reclaim her baby at any time.)8"
81. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1511 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (No consent or surrender shall be taken within the 72 hour period immediately following the birth of the
child.). Other states also impose a waiting rule which establishes a time period following
birth during which parental consent to adoption and/or surrender of a child is not valid:
Alabama (72 hours); Massachusetts (4 days); Kentucky (5 days); Virginia (10 days). See
supra note 72.
82. A rule that imposed a waiting period of a few days would not interfere with this
choice. For a few days, the baby could stay in the hospital. If the natural mother felt
confident she was going through with the adoption, she could consent for the adopters to
spend time with the newborn without violating a prohibition of surrendering the child
before the waiting period expired.
An extended waiting period before the mother is permitted to surrender the child
would not be a wise policy. It would prevent even the mother who knows she is willing to
give up her child from placing her, with the result that the child must be placed in foster
care. When this solution is required, it is both expensive for the state and destructive to
the child who should be permitted to start her life with her permanent family.
83. The rule turning on surrender of the child should apply when the child has been
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A problem with following the time-of-surrender line for surrogacy arrangements is that it may not fit comfortably with a
particular jurisdiction's policy concerning the rights of natural
mothers who place their child for adoption. While there basically is no explicit law concerning the rights of a mother to
change her mind in a surrogacy arrangement, every jurisdiction
has had to cope repeatedly with the issue within the more common adoption situation, and each jurisdiction has a rather explicit law-be it statutory or judgemade-concerning the time at
which the mother's consent to adoption becomes irrevocable. In
some jurisdictions the cut off line is similar to the one I have
suggested: some have the rule that once a natural mother has
surrendered her child for adoption, she retains no right to revoke her consent to adoption 4 unless she can show that her consent was obtained by coercion, fraud, or duress."
turned over to the adoptive couple; the reasons for it do not apply with anywhere near
equal force where the child has been turned over to the adoption agency or placed in
foster care or another temporary setting and not yet placed with the couple who are to
adopt. Nonetheless the law often does not distinguish between these two different situations in assessing whether the mother has a right to change her mind. Indeed in some
states it is more difficult for a mother to revoke consent in situations where the baby is
still in a temporary placement than in some situations where the baby is with her permanent family. By statute they make a parent's surrender of a child to an approved agency
"valid and binding," but allow parents who have privately placed their child with an
adoptive couple to revoke at any time prior to final judgment of adoption (months later).
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-41, 9:3-46(a) (West 1987-88); A.L.& B.L. v. P.A. & M.A.,
No. A-2452-85T1, Slip Op. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 21, 1986). See also note 87
infra, In the agency context the child may still be in temporary care when the parent
changes her mind, so there is less interest in preventing the natural mother from having
her child. One can understand the reason for the state's rule (the agency affords more
protection against overreaching in convincing the mother to give up her child than the
unsupervised independent adoption situation) while still observing that it does not accord with the best interests of the child.
Surrogacy is more closely analogous to the more difficult situation where the mother
revokes her consent after the child has been placed with the couple who are to adopt.
84. See, e.g., In re Santore, 28 Wash. App. 319, 623 P.2d 702 (1981); In re Adoption
of Trent, 229 Kan. 224, 624 P.2d 433 (1981). See generally, 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption, § 45.
See also Note, Irrevocability of Consent to Surrender of a Child for Adoption: C.C.L v.
The Natural Parents,398 So. 2d 220 (Miss. 1981), 2 Miss. C. L. REv. 423 (1982) (biological parents were not entitled to revoke their consent to the surrender of the child to an
adoption agency).
85. The issue of what constitutes coercion, fraud, or duress of course can greatly affect the meaning of this rule. Most parents surrendering their child for adoption are
operating under some sort of coercive circumstances, so a broad interpretation of those
terms could effectively undercut the import of the rule which, more than any other,
seems to make the moment of surrender a moment of finality. In Sims v. Sims, 30 Ill.
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In other states, however, quite a different line is drawn. At
the opposite extreme, some states adhere to the rule that the
natural mother has an absolute right to demand the return of
her child, until entry of the final adoption decree; 6 jurisdictions
differ as to when that decree can issue, but 6 months or a year
are common periods of time. And, as a middle position, many
jurisdictions place the right of the mother to regain custody after surrender but before final adoption in the discretion of the
court, which will in each case decide upon the facts whether rev87
ocation of the surrender is warranted.
While in one sense it is appealing to assimilate adoption in
a surrogacy context to a state's adoption laws generally, some of
the rules concerning the mother's ability to change her mind are
App. 3d 406, 332 N.E.2d 36 (1975), for example, the court held that duress existed as a
matter of law when a 16-year-old mother had consented to the adoption of her child only
after her parents had said they would not fulfill their legal obligation to support her
during her minority unless she surrendered the baby. In In re Adoption of Giambrone,
262 So.2d 566 (La. App. 1972), the parents of a 20-year-old mother refused to let her
return to their home, where she had been living, with the baby. But the court held that
was not duress within the meaning of the consent requirement. In Huebert v. Marshall,
132 Ill. App. 2d 793, 270 N.E.2d 464 (1971), a court found duress where a mother consented to give up her eight-day-old infant only after the father lost his job and told the
mother he was going to leave her. But cf. In Re Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass
230, 181 N.E. 2d 836 (1962) (no principle of law requires that surrenders be held valid
only if executed free from emotions, tension, and pressures caused by the situation).
86. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796 (since consent to adoption can be
withdrawn at any time before an adoption decree is entered, the acts of a parent in
consenting to and delivering a child for adoption are done with the reserved legal right to
withdraw consent at any time before entry of an adoption.).
87. See, e.g., Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321
N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971); Warner v. Ward, 401 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1966)(because
mother was distressed when she consented to adoption, judge permits her to withdraw
her consent prior to the final adoption decree).
Moreover, some jurisdictions have a different rule concerning the effect of surrender
for agency adoptions and for private placements, usually making private placements less
certain-more revocable-than agency adoptions. Sees v. Baber, 377 A.2d 628 (N.J.
1977). See also Louisiana (irrevocable through agency, 30 days for independent adoption); North Carolina (30 days in agency relinquishment, 3 months non-agency); Texas
(public agency and some other agencies are irrevocable; otherwise 60 days); Tennessee
(30 days with agency, 90 days for independent placement); Georgia (birth mother has
permanent right to revoke independent placement!); ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 4,
at 76-85.
In one sense it is actually less appropriate for private placements to be revocable, in
that the baby is virtually always with the adopting couple after surrender, while in the
agency adoption situation the agency or a foster home may still have physical custody of
the child. See supra note 83.
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quite troublesome and seem calculated to produce extreme
problems for the courts, for the child, and for the parties-particularly the adopting parents. One recent case in California, this one involving a private adoption, dramatically illustrates the problem. The Catanzero family adopted an infant at
birth; they took her home from the hospital. It was a private
adoption, arranged through a lawyer and "adoption counselor,"
and the Catanzeros never met the birth mother. Under California law concerning private adoption, the adoption is final only
when the birth mother signs the adoption papers six months after the birth. In this case at the end of the six month period the
birth mother was nowhere to be found, so the final papers were
not signed. It was when the child was 11 months old that the
Catanzeros found themselves in court, defending their custody
of their daughter, and in a 15-minute hearing losing custody to
the birth mother.8 8 The birth mother had not informed them
that she wanted the child until the child was more than eight
months old.
Because a rule that a natural mother can change her mind
about adoption after the adoptive family has been given physical
custody of the child seems as inappropriate for agency adoption
or private adoption as it is for surrogacy arrangements, one
might argue that the rule should be changed for all categories of
adoption. One might conclude that if a court lacks power to
make that change for adoption generally, the proper course is to
assimilate the rules for surrogacy to those that prevail for adoption. If only the legislature can change the rule-if it is an explicit statutory rule, for example-then it should change the
statute with respect to all categories of adoption at once. While
there is a certain logic to that argument, a court that was con88. See Frontline, supra note 4.
The Catanzeros did eventually win back the child. The original court had held for
the mother on the ground that she "did not know what she was doing" when she gave up
the child. According to California law, the mother who has not signed the final consent
papers has a right to reclaim the child, unless it can be proved that she intentionally
abandoned the child. Needless to say, this standard is flexible, but it does state a presumption for custody by the natural mother of the child. A couple in the position of the
Catanzeros could not predict with any confidence in a case like this that they could
prove intentional abandonment and that they would retain custody.
In a situation like this a judge may be very much influenced by his own impressions
of which of the parties would make the better parents. Cf. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J.
Super. at 315, 525 A.2d at 1131.
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vinced of the potential for damage in a rule leaving continuing
discretion in the natural mother might latch onto the differences
in surrogacy and the other adoptive situations to create a strict
cut-off for surrogacy, even if it felt disabled from doing that
more generally.
Although it would be stretching, a court might reason that
the genetic connection of the father with the child is particularly
relevant when the father and his wife take physical custody; it
may possibly ease or speed the process of bonding when the
child and the new parents get together. Either under some such
rationale, or simply upon a preference for a rule that the natural
mother's rights end when she gives up the child, the court might
thereby make a different rule for surrogacy than the rule established in that jurisdiction for adoption generally.
While I have spoken of the ideal rule as one that would terminate the mother's rights when she hands physical custody
over to the adoptive couple, a legislative rule that drew another
clear line and that created only a very short period of uncertainty after the adopters took custody would not be objectionable. Presumably, all could live with a period of uncertainty, dependent upon the birth mother's continuing resolution, for a
period of a week or less. (But if the birth mother did not affirmatively assert her right during that period, it would have to be
cut off in order to avoid problems like that in Catanzero where
the mother could not be located.) The objection is to any period
for the natural mother to revoke that would result in any
lengthy uncertainty after the adoptive couple have physical custody of the child.
SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS

If surrogacy contracts are to be legal at all, the above analysis would support treating them as contracts that are voidable
because of considerations of public policy. As discussed above,
there are other occasions in contract law in which voidable or
option contracts are recognized, and the developed case law with
respect to such contracts could appropriately apply to surrogacy
contracts.8 9 Under this approach, the father in a surrogacy arrangement would be bound at least by the time the mother be89.

See supra text accompanying notes 60-69.
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came pregnant, but she would not be bound until she turned
over the child.90
A possible criticism of this proposal is that it seriously undercuts surrogacy arrangements while purporting to allow them.
If in practice giving the mother the option to change her mind
made the contracts sufficiently unattractive to couples like John
and Diane that they no longer wanted to use them, then it would
seem pointless to allow the contracts in this form. The critique
does not, however, seem well taken. While John and Diane
would doubtless prefer a fully enforceable contract, making the
contract depend upon the mother's continued agreement would
not seem seriously to limit the appeal of surrogacy
arrangements.'
Under either a unilateral or a voidable contract approach,
the surrogate "contract" in a sense amounts to a statement of
intent on the part of the mother that she is willing to have a
baby for the contracting couple and to give it up after it is born.
There is every reason to believe that when women enter into
such arrangements they do and will intend to perform; what experience there is shows that the overwhelming majority of surrogates do perform the contract without any resistance.9 2 That
does not mean that these mothers do not feel grief at parting
with their offspring; they do. But they know when they enter the
90. Traditionally unilateral contracts were not binding on either party until performance was completed, but in order to prevent hardship to the offeree who commenced
performance, the rule was changed making them enforceable by the performing party
and irrevocable by the offeror "as soon as the offeree has started to perform the act."
L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 37 (2d ed. 1965). The RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS abandons the "unilateral contract" terminology but also provides that the
offeror would be bound when performance commences. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 45 (1981).
The "voidable contract" characterization seems more appropriate for surrogacy,
however, since the option to avoid is imposed for reasons of policy and not as a reflection
of the parties' intent. Under that characterization, the offeror (but not the offeree) would
probably be bound from the signing of the contract. The contractor who changed his
mind about giving his semen would, however, benefit from the arguments against enforcing contracts in a very personal realm that were discussed as arguments for the surrogate
who wishes to withdraw. See supra note 14 and text accompanying notes 35, 51-58.
Moreover, the unilateral contract characterization or the option contract characterization
could soon come to be appropriate for surrogacy. See supra notes 63 & 64.
91. This would be particularly true if the jurisdiction had a clear rule that the father
would not be liable for support. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 2.
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arrangement that giving up the baby is what is expected of
them; they generally do not feel they have the means to take
care of the baby themselves; and most of them, accordingly, are
satisfied that the course they want when the child is born is to
turn the child over to the couple for whom they bore her. If current experience is any guide, therefore, the rule that the surrogate has the right to change her mind will not produce a change
of mind in many cases; but when it occurs, the legal rights-at
least the rights under the contract 93-will be clear.
Will this situation of surrogate mothers volunteering in
good faith to perform and being generally prepared to stick with
their agreement persist under a regime that clearly gives them
the right to change their mind? Or will a mother's clear options
under that regime put her in a position of power vis A vis the
adopting couple that she might be able to misuse? Although that
issue deserves examination, it is difficult to imagine very many
instances of a person fraudulently entering into a surrogacy arrangement. What would a woman have to gain by volunteering
as a surrogate when she knows she will change her mind and
94
keep the baby for herself?
One thing the woman would obtain by making the promise
is the sperm of the husband in the adopting couple. She surely
would not obtain that absent the surrogacy arrangement, for the
only reason he is willing to give it to her is so that he can have a
child that is biologically his. But it is difficult to see this as an
incentive on her part to defraud him. While his sperm is very
special to him (and maybe also to his wife) because it enables
him to have a child with whom he is biologically connected, it
seems unlikely it would be very special to her or any more desirable than sperm she might easily obtain without any surrogacy
promise. 5
The other possible incentive for a women to enter a surrogacy arrangement fraudulently, knowing that she intends to
change her mind, is payment-payment of her fee and also of
93. See infra text accompanying notes 102-59.
94. The obvious possibility of becoming a surrogate to get support from the father is
discussed infra text accompanying notes 156-161. I conclude, however, that the father
should not, in these circumstances, be obligated to assume the usual responsibilities of a
natural father.
95. One can be inseminated artificially without great expense.
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her medical and other expenses. Of course the only payment she
will receive if she does revoke is whatever passes prior to her
change of heart; if she has an absolute right to revoke prior to
the delivery of the child to the adopting couple, it would be wise
to reserve payment of the greater part of the fee until that time,
and presumably that would be common practice (or even is today). But medical and some living expenses would probably be
paid before the completion of performance-they would probably be paid as they accrued. The surrogate would be liable to
repay if she backed out on the deal but she might count on the
adoptive couple not pursuing her for the expenses, particularly if
her ability to repay is questionable and if the expenses are not
terribly significant in amount.
It does not make sense, however, to think of many persons
volunteering as surrogates because they really want a baby for
themselves but want some chump to pay their medical expenses.
Although a woman might expect thus to get her bills paid, she
probably could get insurance for less than the lawyers' fees she
risks incurring, and the avenue of insuring herself is likely to
involve her in much less pain and suffering.9 6 While one can hypothesize a woman profiteering from entering into a fraudulent
agreement to be a surrogate-knowing that she plans to pull out
at the last minute-it does not seem likely that any significant
number of women would enter these arrangements as a means of
cheating the contracting couple out of either medical expenses
or sperm.
Even if surrogate mothers do have a right to revoke, a contracting couple setting up a surrogacy arrangement should be
able to assure themselves that they were entering an arrangement where they had a good chance of obtaining a baby, although they would not have a certainty of success. At the interview stage, they would want to discover not only whether the
prospective surrogate mother was healthy and a person who genetically they would want to conceive and bear their child, but
also whether she was sincere and sufficiently comfortable with
her choice that it seemed likely she would go through with the
96. In addition, many women unable to foot the medical bills for childbirth could
enlist the financial support of Medicare or Medicaid which pays the costs of childbirth
for the poor in many states.
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deal. Even without a rule allowing a mother to revoke, such an
interview-and perhaps a more thorough psychological
study-is considered necessary, and is arranged either by the
contracting couple or, more commonly, by an agency that arranges surrogacy contracts.9
I do not think therefore that giving the mother the option
to change her mind is likely to create a wave of women entering
into these contracts pretending that they are willing to be surrogates but really intending to produce a child for themselves. But
I do not think that the solution I prefer of giving the mother the
ability to revoke is problem-free. Even apart from the obvious
problem of the hardship it can impose on the would-be adopters,
there are other difficulties with giving the mother power to decide whether or not to abide by the contract, and there are also
problems with having a period in which it is legally uncertain
who will be the parents of the child.
The first difficulty is that the period where the mother can
change her mind creates, or rather exacerbates, an opportunity
for ektortion." If the agreed price in the contract is $10,000, and
97. Even if the rule were that the adopting couple had legal rights to enforce a contract when the mother changed her mind, this kind of assessment before entering a contract would be necessary; even if the adopting couple had legal rights they would necessarily want to avoid litigation if possible.
For a description of the screening process at Surrogate Parenting Associates, one of
the better known surrogate centers see Mellown, supra note 4, at 239. The author reports that as well as testing for disease and selecting persons on the basis of the couple's
requests for specific racial and physical characteristics,
the prospective mother . .undergoes psychiatric interviews and a battery of intelligence and basic personality tests. The testing is designed to analyze the surrogate mother's ability to surrender her child after delivery, and to reveal personality disorders or low intelligence. The intensity of the screening process
varies.
...The results of these tests . . . are sent to the couple who may accept or
reject the woman.

Id. (citations omitted).
In the Baby "M" case, the Infertility Center of New York had received a psychological report on Mary Beth Whitehead in April 1984 which stated that Mrs. Whitehead
"expects to have strong feelings about giving up the baby at the end." In the report, the
psychologist suggested that those feelings be explored "in somewhat more depth." The
Center failed to inform the Sterns of the report, a fact that Mr. Stern has complained of
during the trial. Hanley, supra note 9, at B2, col. 5.
98. Few instances of extortion by surrogate mothers have been publicized. Two are
reported in KEANE & BREO, supra note 4. In one case, the surrogate mother is said to
have refused to fulfill her part of the surrogate agreement after she learned that other
surrogates were receiving compensation in addition to pregnancy-related expenses. After
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Mary has a legal right to back out, what is to prevent her, after
John and Diane have developed expectations that they are about
to become parents, from tripling her price?
While this is a genuine and to some degree unsolvable problem, it is not entirely the result of giving the mother a legal right
to revoke, and it also is not entirely preventable by any rule that
is adopted. Even in the uncertain situation of the law today, the
mother could, engage in the same conduct, threatening to resist
enforcement of the contract unless the price were raised. Or she
could threaten abortion during pregnancy unless her demands
were met. Indeed the same possibilities for extortion exist today
in the private adoption situation; while one might say the wouldbe adopters are less committed because neither of them has any
biological link to the child, in fact the emotional commitment
and level of expectation may also be very great and the couple
who wants to adopt might easily be willing to make a substantial
payment under the table in order to assure the success of their
arrangement.
Perhaps the most effective way to prevent this possibility in
the surrogacy context would be to give absolute rights to the
adopting couple once the contract was executed, or as soon as
the child was conceived, and allow them specifically to enforce
the contract exactly as written. While that approach lessens possibilities for extortion, it does not eliminate them, and in my
judgment, for the reasons discussed above, a solution that treats
the baby like any other chattel one sells in the market place is
not worth its costs.9 9

There is then nothing that the law can do that will absolutely prevent possibilities of extortion. Even if surrogacy were
learning this, the surrogate is said to have demanded $7,500 to fulfill the contract. The
surrogate reportedly also threatened to abort the fetus, and to refuse to relinquish the
child after birth. The book also reports another case involving a surrogate mother who
demanded that the child's father and his wife pay for drugs and alcohol.
99. Moreover, even this extreme solution would not be entirely effective. The natural
mother could still threaten abortion. Even in the unlikely event that the option to decide
upon abortion were legally removed from her, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying
text, she would in fact have power to obtain an abortion and inform the couple only
later-so the threat of so acting could be the basis for extortion. And even apart from
abortion, if there was anything that the mother had power to do that would make obtaining the baby difficult for the adopting couple, like changing her residence and being
difficult to locate, she could threaten so to act and use the threat as a basis for raising
the price she would be paid.
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outlawed and efforts were put into enforcing the prohibition,
some persons nonetheless would be willing to enter the arrangement; they could charge a great deal for their services initially,
and after they became pregnant, they could raise their price.
Such possibilities are inherent when the mother has something
that the would-be adopters want very much-fertility, and later,
a fetus, then a child, that the infertile couple very much want to
have turned over to them.
Perhap3 the best that the law can do to prevent the mother
from being able to use her position of power over the disposition
of the baby to extort additional money would be to make clear
that any such demand for a greater amount than was specified
in the contract would constitute extortion or an attempt to traffic children contrary to state law, and if discovered would be
prosecuted vigorously. The mother making such a threat would
run the risk that the couple rather than agreeing to her demands
would report her to the authorities. This might serve as a deterrent, but even if it did convince some who otherwise might extort to content themselves with the original agreement, it would
not work perfectly. Presumably some still would take the risk,
gambling correctly on the likelihood that the adopting couple
would rather pay the elevated price than lose the baby.
A second problem from the contract being voidable arises in
the somewhat unusual situation when no one wants the baby. I
will discuss this problem in the context of two rather different
situations that might plausibly arise: (1) The mother gives birth
to the child and is prepared to go through with the arrangement,
but the couple that agreed to adopt have changed their minds
either because they have become pregnant; or because they have
separated; and (2) The mother, who has always fully intended to
go through with the surrogacy contract, gives birth to a child,
but during the birth process, the child suffers oxygen deprivation and the prognosis is that she will be at least mildly retarded; the couple who had agreed to adopt concludes that they
do not want to adopt a retarded child and would rather try
again through another surrogacy arrangement.
The first case is the easier of the two because the interests
of the child are not as strongly implicated. If the child is a
healthy newborn and neither the birth mother nor the couple
who had planned to adopt want to provide a home for her,
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someone else will accept the baby with enthusiasm. The contract
problem must still be resolved, because the mother presumably
would still want her fee. If it has not yet been paid, she might go
to court saying that she wants to collect; she performed her part
of the bargain; and it is not her fault that the couple changed
their minds. Should the contract be enforced against them?
Some would find it inherently unfair for John and Diane to
be bound by the surrogacy contract when Mary is not and for
Mary alone to have the option to withdraw. Others would point
out that Mary never indicated the intention to withdraw from
the contract and did all that was expected of her, and would
allow her by an offer to surrender the child to make the contract
a binding one. They also would point out that this result fits
with the traditional treatment of voidable, unenforceable, or option contracts, and with the current treatment of unilateral contracts; there it has not been considered troubling that only one
party has the option to withdraw; a standard resolution of those
contract situations is that one person the option whether to
perform. 100
-Of course, some contracts are unenforceable by any party;
policy considerations would determine whether that resolution
controlled here, and some would argue as a matter of policy that
mutuality of obligations is the fairer course. Unless one is enthusiastic about surrogacy arrangements, it is difficult to get too upset about the unfairness that would thus be visited upon the surrogate mother in this hypothetical. Since the baby can be well
cared for even without the surrogacy arrangement, there is no
compelling case for enforcing it so that the surrogate mother
would be able to get her $10,000 and absolutely to count upon
an arrangement that.we do not permit the adopters to count on
and that we do not approve of as a matter of social policy. Although contract doctrine is available to protect the surrogate
mother here, the contrary resolution-making the surrogate
mother take the risk that she will not be paid in the unlikely
event that the adopters change their minds-would not seem objectionable as a matter of policy. If the risk deterred some
women from entering into surrogacy contracts, so much the
better.
100.

See supra text accompanying notes 59-66 and note 90.
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Allowing the adopters to withdraw from the contract would
be difficult not because of the first situation, involving a healthy
and adoptable baby, but because of the second example, involving a handicapped and presumably much less adoptable baby. In
this situation the interests of the child, which after all should be
the paramount interests here, are to have a home or at least a
family; the child will suffer greatly from any uncertainty concerning who are her legal parents and who should at least take
responsibility for her placement and her care, and that uncertainty would inevitably flow from a system giving all parties to
the contract an opportunity to renounce it after birth.
In this situation, there is a strong policy argument that the
couple who had promised to adopt should not be permitted to
withdraw from the contract if the mother attempts to turn the
child over to them; this is especially defensible if there was not
any indication before the baby was born that the mother herself
had second thoughts about the contract. Except for the handicap there is every likelihood that the adoption would have taken
place; in the vast majority of cases the surrogate mother complies with the contract without resistance, and there was nothing
to indicate that would not be the case here.
There does not seem any particular equity in allowing the
couple, who participated in the creation of this baby, to assure
themselves a perfectly healthy newborn and to be able to reject
a newborn who does not meet their specifications, a privilege
natural parents do not share. Since every likelihood was that the
adoptive couple would achieve their ends with the contract had
there been no difficulty in the birthing process, and since they
are probably in the better position to cope with the problems of
caring for a handicapped child, if only financially, it seems best
from the point of view of social policy, and also from the point
of view of the baby, to lay the problem at their door. After all, if
the surrogate mother had every intention of going through with
the contract, as we have hypothesized, she probably is in a position where she never had the resources even to take care of a
healthy child and did not make that part of her plans. The
couple on the other hand had the commitment and the expectation that they would receive a child, and the financial resources
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to handle that responsibility, ' and they should not be permitted to withdraw at the expense of the child just because the
02
child is born with a handicap.'
CUSTODY CONTESTS INDEPENDENT OF THE SURROGACY
CONTRACT-SURROGACY AND LAWS GOVERNING THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF UNWED PARENTS OF A NEWBORN CHILD

Even if the suggested view prevails, so that a contract is not
enforceable when the mother decides before surrendering the
child that she does not want to part with her, there is still some
question what are the rights and obligations of the parties in the
absence of the contract.
In the classic adoption context, where the expectant parents
have no biological relationship with the child, the expectant parents clearly have no legal rights to enforce any understanding to
acquire a child who in fact has never lived with them. There is
one respect in which the surrogacy situation is considerably

more complicated: If the adoption does fall through, still in the
101. The adoptive couple in a private placement situation would be vulnerable to
much of this policy argument, but would probably be treated differently because (1) they
did not participate in the creation of the child; and (2) a contract, if any exists, plays
much less of a role in their relationship with the birth mother. If they do get the baby
from the mother, it will be because of an understanding they have with her but probably
not on the basis of a contract. There is nothing to prevent her even from giving the baby
to another couple; they probably have no enforceable rights to the child as against
anyone.
The adopting couple in a surrogacy arrangement by contrast are proceeding on the
contract, though a voidable, option, or unilateral contract. Even though the surrogate
mother is not bound to perform, when she does turn the baby over, the contract will
define their mutual rights and obligations. Moreover, if the surrogate mother decides to
give the baby to anyone other than the couple with whom she contracted, they probably
have a right to claim the baby as against anyone in the world other than the natural
mother, because of the father's biological connection. See infra note 115.
102. Of course a better system still might be that, at least in the case of a handicapped child with extraordinary expenses, the state would subsidize the expenses or otherwise help out the parents. In the absence of such a system generally, however, it is
difficult to see why the state should pick up the expenses of children whose parents
decided by contract to create them and then were disappointed by a handicap.
The state does to some extent help out parents of handicapped children, most importantly by providing a free appropriate education for these children as well as others,
even though their education may be more expensive. See Education for the Handicapped, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as Act of
Apr. 13, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230 tit. VI, 84 Stat. 121, 175-88) especially subch. II, Assistance for Education of All Handicapped Children, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-20.
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surrogacy context the biological father may be able to claim a
right to the child because of his biological connection. His inability to prevail on the contract (either because the mother is
not bound by it or because surrogacy contracts generally are
considered illegal in that jurisdiction) is not necessarily determinative of whether he has any rights to custody or visitation, or,
indeed, any obligation to support his offspring.
One variable that may affect whether the contracting father
has rights independent of the contract is whether or not the surrogate was inseminated artificially. Most states by statute provide either that sperm donors have no rights or obligations in
the offspring that their sperm produces, or that they are not the
natural father of the child so produced. In many states, however,
the provisions do not apply when the insemination was privately
accomplished rather than being performed through a doctor.' 013
Seemingly sperm donors could have the parental rights and obligations 10T of an unwed parent in that situation. 105 Some state
103. See, e.g., Jourdan C. v. Mary K. 179 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 386; 224 Cal. Rptr. 530
(1986). As of 1985, twenty-seven states had special provisions concerning artificial insemination. Several state statutes are modelled after § 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act, and
they provide that when artificial insemination is performed in accordance with statutory
requirements, the sperm donor will not be treated as the natural father. See Bick-Rice,
The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial Insemination by Donors, 46 OHIO ST. L. J.
1055, 1062 n.80 [hereinafter Bick-Rice] (discussing California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Washington and Wyoming as examples of such statutes). Section 5(a) of The Uniform Parentage Act provides in part:
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with the semen donated by a man not
her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a
child thereby conceived.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§ 5(a), 9A U.L.A. 579, 592-593 (1979).

It further provides, in § 5(b):
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as
if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
Id. The California, Wyoming and Colorado statutes omit the term "married" in subsection (b) of their respective statutes.
There also are statutes dealing with artificial insemination in nineteen other states.
At least ten of the nineteen states require a doctor to perform the insemination in order
for the statute to apply. Most make the child the legitimate child of a married couple
consenting to the insemination. See generally, Bick-Rice, supra, at 1055-1064 for a review of current provisions concerning artifical insemination. Most do not further stipulate that the donor has no rights in or responsibilities to the child, but the provisions
they do contain would be expected to have exactly that effect.
104. While sperm donors have occasionally won parental rights, and taken on con-
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courts might hold, moreover, that provisions blocking parental
rights and obligations of sperm donors have no application when
the insemination purported to be part of a surrogacy arrangement, reasoning that the statutes were not intended to cover situations where the parties intended the father to have parental
responsibilities. 10 In those situations where the father is not
comitant obligations, it is an open question whether a mother could force financial responsibility upon a semen donor who seeks to disassociate himself from the child. In
Jourdan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 386, 224 Cal Rptr. 530 (1986), the court
held that the purpose of CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005(b) is to permit individuals to donate
semen, for the purpose of artificial insemination, without fear of liability for child support. It did, however, confine its limitation of liability to instances where the insemination was performed through a doctor. See Bick-Rice, supra note 90, at 1058-62, 1066-67
(discussing the legal dilemma of a sperm donor when there is no statute insulating him
from responsibility and concluding that when there is no such statute, the outcome of
litigation is often conflicting and uncertain).
105. California has declined to apply its provision that a sperm donor is not the natural father of offspring conceived by artificial insemination, when the insemination was
not accomplished pursuant to the statutory requirement of a physician's supervision.
The court did not apply it, for example, in Jourdan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 386, 224
Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986), where the semen donor wished to assert paternal rights. In that
case the natural mother was raising the child with another woman rather than with a
man. In C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977), the donor was willing to
assume the responsibilities of a father, and the inseminated mother, who was not married, was not permitted to resist this overture. It may have been relevant in that case
that the mother and the donor did have a personal relationship, and had considered
marrying each other, even though they accomplished the insemination artificially (without the aid of a doctor) because they did not want to have intercourse prior to marriage.
106. Some states also permit the nonpaternity statute to be avoided if the parties
have agreed in writing to paternity, as they will have in the surrogacy context. A New
Jersey statute provides, for example, that, given written consent and a doctor's supervision, the semen donor is to be treated in law as if he were not the father of a child
conceived "[u]nless the donor of semen and the woman have entered into a written contract to the contrary." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17:44 (West 1985). The law in the state of

Washington is substantially similar. See

WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§ 26.26.050 (1986).

In Sherwyn v. Department of Social Services, 173 Cal. App. 3d 52, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778
(1985), the California court of appeals expressed "grave doubts" about the applicability
in the surrogacy situation of state statutes (1) presuming paternity in the husband of the
surrogate mother if neither the mother nor her husband challenge his paternity; and (2)
denying the status of natural fatherhood to a sperm donor in a surrogacy arrangement.
The lower court had applied the provisions in the context of a surrogacy arrangement,
and had upheld the constitutionality of the statutes so applied. Both discussions of the
issue are of interest, but the court of appeals ultimately decided the case on other
grounds; it vacated the trial court's judgment for failure to present a justiciable
controversy.
At the other extreme from decisions and statutes protecting and enforcing contracting fathers' intent to acquire parental rights, are cases prohibiting fathers in surrogacy arrangements from using existing laws to establish paternity, even when the surrogate mother does not oppose them. See In re Baby Girl, 9 Fam. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2348
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barred by special provisions governing sperm donors-either be-

cause the insemination was natural or because no special provision applies-then it would appear that the law concerning the
rights of a biological father who is not married to the mother of
10 7
their child would apply.
Under this law, the rights and obligations of the biological
father might vary according to whether the mother has a husband. Traditionally the rule has been that a child born to a wife
during a marriage is presumed to be the child of that marriage;108 that presumption may either be rebuttable or conclusive. Often even when the presumption is rebuttable, only the
mother or the mother's husband is allowed to attack it; 08 a putative father can challenge the presumption in only a minority of
states. Consequently in order for a putative father-including a
biological father who was party to a surrogacy arrangement-to
establish his paternity, he must in many states have the cooperation of the surrogate mother or her spouse.
In recent years the rule has, however, been subject to constitutional attack, and the attacks have sometimes been successful. 1 0 Reasons for some courts' change in position include the
(Ky. Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 1983) and Syrkowski v. Appleyard 333 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. App.
1983), discussed supra note 36.
107. Of course a state that prohibited surrogacy contracts could, if it wished, deny
the father any right to the child, as a means of strengthening its prohibition of the contracts by creating a situation in which there is no way the father could derive the intended benefit from the arrangement.
108. See GREEN & LONG, supra note 51, at 271 concluding:
At common law, there was also a strong presumption that a child born to a
married woman was the child of her husband. At one time, this presumption
could only be rebutted by proof of the impotency or physical absence from England (beyond the four seas). Though modified by statute, this presumption has
also been accepted in American jurisdictions.
Id. (citations omitted).
In keeping with the state's demonstrated interest in legitimizing children, twentyfour states by statute expressly extend the presumption of legitimacy to children born as
a result of consensual artificial insemination. Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis
of the Problem and Suggestions for Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REv. 71 (1982).
109. See infra note 111. Historically the rule was designed both to preserve family
integrity and to provide a means of indemnifying the state for the expenses of child
support. One court observes: "The chief purpose of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1576,
the progenitor of modern paternity statutes, was not the protection of the child but the
indemnification of the parish for the expenses of the child's support." Dept. of Social
Serv. ex rel Sandra C. v. Thomas J. S., 100 A.D.2d 119, 130, 474 N.Y.S.2d 322,330.
110. One claim is that the right to assert paternity of one's biological child is protected by the due process clause of the United States Constitution; there must be open
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progress in the effectiveness of paternity testing;.1 and a greater
some avenue by which a putative father can establish his paternity. Due process claims
often rely upon Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972), but they go much further than
Stanley, which (1) protected the right of a natural father who had lived with his children
throughout their lives; and (2) dealt only with his protection vis a vis the state, not
suggesting any rights in him to act against the wishes of the natural mother. In Stanley
the mother had died, Stanley had lived with his children, together with the mother, all
their lives, and the state was threatening to remove the children from him to place them
in the custody of the state. The Court asserted that the state statute eliminating him was
based upon a conclusive presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents and held that
in these circumstances Stanley must be given a hearing concerning his fitness before
being separated from his children.
Although Stanley is not strong authority for the proposition, later cases do suggest
that putative fathers generally have a due process right, although a limited one. In
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385 n.3 (1979), the Court spoke of a procedural due
process right, flowing from Stanley, but it did not reach the substantive due process
argument that natural fathers have a right to maintain a parental relationship with their
child unless they are unfit, because it decided the case on the basis of the equal protection clause. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court accorded the unmarried
father some degree of constitutional protection, but very little. Nonetheless, Lehr is consistent with a view that each state must provide some avenue by which paternity may be
asserted.
The United States Supreme Court has not squarely faced the issue whether a state
legislature could constitutionally make the judgment that in cases where the unwed
mother was married and her husband acted as natural father to the child, it is in the
child's best interests to accept that as the child's nuclear family, and to prevent third
persons from asserting claims of paternity.
State courts divide upon the question whether it remains constitutionally permissible for a putative father to be prohibited from claiming paternity with respect to a child
born to a married woman whose husband acts as natural father. Some courts hold that it
is constitutional to bar the unwed father in those circumstances. See, e.g., Petitioner F.
v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075, 1078-79 (Del. 1981); P.B.C. v. D.H., 396 Mass. 68, 72,
483 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (1985), cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 1286, (1986); A. v. X, Y, and Z, 641
P.2d 1222, 1227 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982). See also Market v.
Behm, 394 N.W.2d 239 (Minn.App. 1986).
Some courts, however, have found a due process right in putative fathers to procedures to establish parental rights. See Thornsberry v. Superior Court of Arizona, Mohave Cty., ex rel Hunter, 146 Ariz. 517, 707 P.2d 315 (1985). Other courts have construed
thier statutes to permit a putative father to try to establish rights, in order to avoid the
constitutional issue. See Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis.2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974); Pritz v.
Chesnul, 106 Ill. App. 3d 969, 436 N.E.2d 631 (Ill. 82). See also R. McG. and C. W. v. J.
W. and W. W., 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980)(finding that a statute allowing paternity proceedings to be instituted by a child, her mother and her presumed father, but not by a
putative natural father, impermissibly discriminates according to gender and violates the
federal equal protection clause and also the equal rights provision of the Colorado
constitution).
111. It now is possible to determine with substantial certainty whether or not a particular person is the biological father in most cases. In earlier days paternity proceedings
would often cast a shadow over paternity without ever resolving paternity issues. The
reason for the change lies in recent developments in bloodtesting. Even 20 years ago,
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recognition of parental interests of the unwed father in the law
12
generally.'
Accordingly, while there may be a presumption that the
child is the child of the marriage when the surrogate is married,
it may not apply today-or it may not apply conclusively-depending upon the jurisdiction. If the mother is not
married, or if her jurisdiction has no conclusive presumption, or
even if it does and the biological father mounts a successful constitutional attack on the conclusive presumption, then the problem will remain of the need to determine the respective rights of
the biological mother and the biological father without regard to
any contract between them.
Until recently the law was relatively clear that when an 'un3
wed mother had a child, the right to custody lay with her.' Of
course she could be deprived of custody if she was unfit, as can
any parent or set of parents, but unfitness is very strictly defined. Absent unfitness, the unwed mother was the custodian of
her child; the unwed father had no claim to custody against
4
her.1
In recent years this principle has undergone some change,
blood testing for paternity was quite primitive, but today use of HLA tests in combination with the many other available blood tests yields very persuasive proof. See note,
Human Leukocyte Antigen Testing: Technology Versus Policy in Cases of Disputed
Parentage,36 Vand. L. Rev. 1578, 1591 (1983).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 115-32.
113. See Ex parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (tender years presumption). At
common law it was the father rather than the mother who had the right to custody, and
all other rights over the children; the change in favor of the mother occurred around the
middle of the 19th century. Id. (discussing the history).
114. Even Stanley, where the mother had died, is consistent with this traditional
view of the unwed father's rights. But Stanley gave some right to the father after the
mother's death. This notion of layers of rights, rather than equal rights, has a certain
appeal. It allows for clear rules, in an area where clear rules are badly needed. It also
provides maximal security for the child-not eliminating potential caretakers, but lining
them up in a clear order of priority.
Even a donor of semen for artificial insemination might have rights after the inseminated woman and her spouse. For example, if the person inseminated was a single woman, and after her child was born she died or became unfit so that her child had been
taken away from her, the sperm donor might have rights against the rest of the world,
though not against the mother. If he knew of this situation and asserted his rights, and if
he was fit, he might have a right to custody against the rest of the world because of his
biological tie (although in some states he would have to grapple with language in state
statutes cutting off his parental rights, by saying that they were not designed to cover
this situation). As a practical matter most artificial sperm donors do not know about the
future fate of their sperm, and they do not assert interests in pursuing parental rights.
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and the law is much more uncertain than it has been in the past.
Today there are two different realms of uncertainty for the unwed parents who seek to battle out in court their legal rights to
their offspring. The first uncertainty is what the law is; the second is how whatever principle is accepted will apply to them,
given their facts and circumstances, or given the facts and circumstances about themselves that they can establish in court.
A. Recent Cases Concerning the Rights of the Unwed Father
In Caban v. Mohammed, 115 the mother and father had lived

together for more than five years; two children had been born to
them, and both parents had lived together with the children until they were 2 and 4 years old respectively. Caban was listed as
the father on the children's birth certificates. During the period
they lived together, both the mother and the father had been
important caretakers for the children.
After the mother and father separated, and each married,
the mother consented to adoption of the children by her husband, and the father opposed the petition asking that he be the
custodial parent and that his wife be permitted to adopt.116 New
York law at the time gave the unwed mother the power to consent to or veto adoption and did not give the father either right.
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,1 17 held that
it violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment for a state to apply an absolute preference for the mother
115.

441 U.S. 380 (1979).

116. For nine months after the mother and father separated, the children lived with
the mother and her husband. The children were then sent to Puerto Rico with their
maternal grandmother. The mother and her husband were to join them after they raised
some money. When the father visited the children in Puerto Rico, he took them back to
New York in his custody, and then the custody-and-adoption battle started between the
parents. During most of the period when they were separated and before the mother
remarried, the children had lived with their maternal grandmother in Puerto Rico.
The children were five and seven respectively when the petition for adoption was
heard; three years had passed since their natural parents' separation.
In New York, like most jurisdictions, adoption altogether severed the parental tie
with the other biological parent. In Caban, when the New York courts passed upon the
adoption, the natural father found himself faced with the prospect of losing all ties with
the two children he had fathered and raised for two years, only three years prior. Id.
117. Justice Powell wrote for the Court. Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stewart dissented in a separate opinion.
Id.
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over the father of an illegitimate child.
Four years later in Lehr v. Robertson,'18 however, the Court
made clear that equal protection does not require identical
treatment of the mothers and fathers of illegitimate children; it
held that fathers who have not participated in their children's
upbringing do not share the right to equal treatment and have
no constitutional right to prevent the mother's husband from
adopting the child. The Court indicated that unwed fathers need
not be treated on an equal plane with fathers who are married to
the mother of their children, pointing out that "[tihe institution
of marriage has played a critical role . . .in defining the legal

entitlements of family members" and that "state laws almost
universally express an appropriate preference for the formal
family.""' It said that there was a "clear distinction between a
mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility;" that an actual relationship explained Caban,
not a mere biological connection.' 20 While the potential to develop an actual relationship deserves some degree of constitutional protection,' 2 ' it is not on the same level
as the protection
22
due a developed pareht-child relationship.
Even in Caban v. Mohammed itself, there were clear signs
that the Court was not creating a model of pure equality, either
between all unwed parents or between married and unmarried
fathers. The Court explicitly left open the question: What are
the rights of the unmarried father at the time his offspring is
born? The answer to that question would be very important to
118. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
119. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256-57. The Court also pointed out that the father had not
offered to marry the mother; this was not a case where he was willing to formalize the
relationship and legitimize the child but the mother stood in the way of that course. Id.
at 252, 263.
120. Id. at 259-60.
121. In this case the Court held the Constitution was satisfied by the state's provision
for putative fathers to register their claim to paternity, which would entitle them to
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard if there was a proceeding to adopt the
child. Mr. Lehr had not known of the procedure for registration, but nonetheless it was
held that the existence of that procedure adequately protected his inchaote relationship
with his child and that there was no constitutional requirement that he be afforded notice of adoption proceedings or an opportunity to be heard even though both the child's
mother and the judge who approved the adoption knew of his attempt to establish his
paternity before adoption was ordered. Id. at 265.
122. Id. at 259-63; 266-68.
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Mary, John and Diane if they were litigating on a theory of the
rights of the unwed father, instead of litigating as parties to a
surrogate motherhood contract.2 s
The unconstitutionality that the Court found in Caban was
that New York law distinguished solely on the basis of gender
between unmarried mothers and fathers, a distinction the state
had defended before the Supreme Court on the ground that
mothers generally have closer relationships with their children
than fathers do.' The Supreme Court pointed out that such
differences as the New York statute assumes do not invariably
exist, and it contrasted this case, where the mother and the father had both fully participated in the upbringing of their children, with an earlier case in which it rejected an unwed father's
constitutional claim when "he has never exercised actual or legal
custody over his child, and thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, educa' 25
tion, protection, or care of the child.'
The most significant argument the Court had to contend
with in Caban in holding this gender-based classification unconstitutional was the argument that the state's law fulfilled an important state interest in promoting the adoption of illegitimate
children and thereby legitimating them. Allowing both natural
parents equally to veto an adoption would result in the children
123.

Of course parties to a lawsuit can argue both theories, in the alternative.

& HAZARD,

CIVIL PROCEDURE

JAMES

155-56 (3d ed. 1885). A plaintiff in John's position would

want to argue the validity of the contract, but if he lost on that theory, he would want to
argue that he is the better parent and that the child's custody should be decided on that
basis.
Before arguing he was the better parent, the father could argue that the mother was
unfit, if he was in a position to sustain that argument. Since unfitness is very strictly
defined being the standard by which the state deprives a parent or parents of custody
against their will even if there is no other family to adopt them-it seems wrong for the
father to make this argument when he does not have compelling evidence that the
mother should not be allowed to raise her children. He should use the same evidence
instead on the issue whether he is the better parent. A father who makes an unwarranted
unfitness argument risks losing public sympathy and increasing sympathy for the natural
mother.
124. Comparing the actual parents, it appeared that the father was and had been just
as involved with his children as their natural mother was. The mother's case was weakened by sending the children to live with their grandmother; they had not lived with
their mother for more than a year when Caban removed them to New York. Caban, 441
U.S. at 386, 388-89, 391, 394.
125. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (discussed and quoted in Caban,
441 U.S. at 389 n.7).
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remaining illegitimate. The Court found that state interest "an
important one"-serving the interests of the child because it
would "remove the stigma under which illegitimate children suf2
fer" 1"-but
the Court said the state could not accomplish that
end by as irrational a distinction as that between natural
mothers and fathers. Justice Stevens' powerful dissent in Caban
focussed upon the importance of this state interest in promoting
127
legitimation.
Finally, the Court met the objection that it can be difficult
to identify and locate unwed fathers, by suggesting that for
older children the state could differentiate between unwed parents as long as the distinctions between them were not genderbased. For an obvious example, the state can distinguish between unwed parents who live with their child and those who do
not, even if those who live with their child are much more likely
to be unwed mothers than unwed fathers. Moreover, the Court
said specifically that it expressed no view as to whether even a
gender-based line could be drawn between the mothers and the
fathers of newborn children, because the question was not before
it.128
Justice Stevens in his dissent discussed primarily the situation surrounding newborns, saying that the overwhelming majority of adoptions involve infants, and claiming that the Court's
own rule was limited to "adoptions of older children' ...
[where] the father has established a substantial relationship
with the child and is willing to admit paternity.' ,129 In his discussion, he emphasized the differences that exist between
mothers and fathers at the moment that a child is born.130
It is those differences that exist at birth that would be relevant if we were to embark upon a custody contest between John
and Mary after she repudiated the surrogacy contract and he
asserted rights as an unwed biological father. What Justice Stevens suggested, and what much of the Court's language in
Caban and Lehr would support, is that it would be permissible,
perhaps even appropriate, for the state to have a rule favoring
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Caban, 441 U.S at 391.
Id. at 402-03, 407-08, 410 n.20, 412, 414-15.
Id. at 392 n.11, 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 404-06.
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mothers as custodians at this stage. At this moment in time, the
mother has a relationship with the child. She has borne the child
for nine months, has given birth to her, and most probably has
the capability of breast-feeding her. 1 1 The father, however, has
yet to establish a relationship with the child, other than his own
expectations and his biological connection.
True, the father's comparative lack of relationship is not the
father's fault; on the contrary, it seems to be beyond his control
and biologically determined. 132 Does that mean that he should
not be treated the same as the fathers who failed to establish a
relationship with their child whom the Court discussed in
Caban,or is the existence or nonexistence of the relationship the
determinative factor rather than the presence or absence of
fault? In Lehr also it appeared that it was not the fault of the
father that he had not established a relationship with his child;
according to the dissenters, the mother had prevented the father
from seeing their son for the first two years of their son's life.
Nonetheless, because the mother had a continuous bond with
her child, she was permitted by consenting to his adoption by
her husband to cut off the natural father's rights.
There is certainly something to be said for equality between
natural parents even when the parents are not in a de facto family relationship. The main thing to be said against it is that any
rule emphasizing equality, at least equality between parents in
the awarding of custody of newborns, seems to lead us in the
direction of custody contests over who is the better parent. The
rules I would suggest following for the awarding of custody of
newborns whose parents do not constitute a family tend to favor
the mother as custodian. As I shall explain, this is not so much
because mothers are particularly deserving, or because fathers
do not merit protection, but rather because the best interests of
131.

Many authorities believe that breast feeding is the preferred course for both the

baby's physical and psychological development. See, e.g., K.

PRYOR, NURSING YOUR BABY

(1963); A. GESELL, INFANT AND CHILD IN THE CULTURE OF TODAY 71 (1974) (concluding
that "breastfeeding may well constitute a fundamental requirement, not merely a
method of choice. To be sure, the newborn can survive without breastfeeding, but only
with certain very definite deprivations.")
132. It is different from a simple preference for the mother, however, in that a couple
who together conceived a child that was incubated outside of the mother would be on an

equal footing under this test. On those facts there would be no preference for the mother
even at the moment of birth.
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children require having a clear presumption as to who their care-

taker will be.
B.

Custody Contests to Determine Who Is the Better Parent

Any presumption that is established need not necessarily be
gender-based. Just as the Supreme Court struck down the gender-based presumption involved in Caban v. Mohammed, several states have invalidated a "tender years presumption" that
historically was part of the law governing custody awards between parents, and that preferred the mother as the custodian of
children "of tender years." ss But rather than examine all the
facts and circumstances of vying parents, several states have replaced the historical presumption for the mother with another
presumption that is stated in gender-neutral terms. One of the
most enthusiastically received of the proposed new presumptions is the presumption for the primary caretaker, a presumption that usually will favor mothers, who more often than not
are the primary caretakers of their children but, when children
other than newborns are the subject of custody disputes, one
that would in fact favor a father who takes primary responsibility for caring for the children.""
In Garska v. McCoy,' a leading case establishing the presumption for the primary caretaker as the custodian of the chil133. See Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (several courts have abandoned
the tender years doctrine, although the presumption still exists in 22 states).
134. One of the pathbreaking opinions advocating this approach to resolving custody
disputes is Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, J.). See also Derby v.
Derby, 31 Or. App. 803, 571 P.2d 562 (1977), modified on other grounds, 31 Or. App.
1333, 572 P.2d 1080 (1977), rev. denied 281 Or. 323 (1978).
In Garska v. McCoy, the court looked to the following list of criteria in asking who
was the primary caretaker:
(1) preparing and planning meals; (2) bathing, grooming, and dressing; (3)
purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and
trips to physician; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school,
i.e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings;
(6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to
bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the
morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9)
educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and (10) teaching elementary skills,
i.e. reading, writing and arithmetic.
Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
135. 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, J.). See also supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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dren, the court explained that "[the loss of children is a terrifying specter to concerned and loving parents: however, it is
particularly terrifying to the primary caretaker parent who, by
virtue of the caretaking function, was closest to the child ...
Since the parent who is not the primary caretaker is usually in
the superior financial position," that parent has better resources
to fight a drawn out custody battle if no presumption is to be
operative; the primary caretaker will either lose custody through
an inability to litigate, or she may be tempted to trade the custody of the child for reduced child support or alimony payments,
a trade which will not benefit the child." 6 "Since trial courts
almost always award custody to the primary caretaker parent
anyway, establishment of certainty in this regard permits the issues of alimony and support to stand upon their own legs and to
be litigated or settled upon the merits of relevant financial criteria, without introducing into the equation the terrifying prospect
of loss to the primary caretaker of the children.'

3

7

The court

also relied upon the propositions that "in the average [custody]
proceeding intelligent determination of relative degrees of fitness requires a precision of measurement which is not possible
given the tools available to judges;" and also "there is an urgent
need

. . .

for a legal structure upon which [parents] may rely in

reaching a settlement."'3 8
Another, and perhaps even more appealing, way in which
the court might have defended its presumption is that the child
in all likelihood would be more upset and grieved by the loss of
the primary caretaker than by the loss of the other parent, who
by hypothesis the child sees less and who does less for the
child-at least less that the child is aware of. The court did say
that of course its rule called for an exception if the primary caretaker fails to provide emotional support, routine cleanliness, or
nourishing food,' 3 9 and the court also recognized that its presumption would not provide any guidance in families where par136. Several studies have shown that fathers are often advised by their lawyers to
litigate for custody even if they do not desire it in order to reduce the level of the support they will be required to pay. Note, Lawyering for the Child, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1131
n.21 (1978).
137, Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 360.
138. Id. at 361.
139. Id.
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ents divide roles sufficiently that there is no primary parent who
performs "the lion's share of the child raising." 140 On the other
hand, in a great many cases its rule would achieve a clear result
that parties could take into account in settling their case or that
a court could apply without protracted litigation: Custody of the
child will go to the primary caretaker parent as long as that parent is fit and as long as the child is not old enough to formulate
and express a contrary desire."'
The primary caretaker presumption bears similarities to another suggested rule that many psychologists and experts in
family law defend and that has been put forth most thoroughly
by Goldstein, Solnit, and Freud in a series of books: 142 the presumption for continuity of care. That presumption might favor a
primary caretaker in a situation in which both parents had been
living together and with the child up until the moment of litigation. That presumption is most commonly discussed, however,
when the issue is whether to move the child to a new placement,
thereby severing the custodial relationship that the child is accustomed to. Goldstein, Solnit and Freud warn against changing
from a successful custodial relationship, out of a desire to produce something "even better." They emphasize also that the
"psychological parent" is the important figure to the child-the
person who takes care of the child's needs on a daily basis-and
that this relationship is more important to preserve than any
biological connection.
These presumptions are often used in custody contests.
How would they apply in a contest between unwed parents arguing over who should be the custodian of a newborn? 4 3
140. It may be that families where both parents are caretakers are those where it is
most important, because of both parents' prior relationship with the child, that both
relationships be preserved, and where it might even make sense in some circumstances
for them to share custody.
141. The primary caretaker rule also has the virtue of avoiding some of the class bias
so evident in other tests of the better parent for custody. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
142. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, AND A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973); BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
143. The presumption might apply in the same way in a dispute between married
parents who do not live together or who are separating and who both want custody of
their newborn child. In any event, an unmarried father should not be in a better position
to claim custody of his biological child than a married father. One can easily imagine
arguments that the unmarried father should not be treated as well, especially where he
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If the tests are applicable at all to parents disputing over a
newborn, it appears that the mother would at that moment in
time be the primary caretaker and the person with whom the
child has the greatest relationship to continue. Not only has the
mother given the most of herself to the child (granted, not by
choice but by biological necessity), but the mother is also far
more familiar to the child than is the father. The child has listened to her heartbeat, for example, for months before birth.
Some psychologists believe that the child knows the mother
from birth in a way the child knows no other person and that it
is disruptive and even traumatic for the child to part with her
mother at that stage.""' Moreover, the mother's ability to
breastfeed the baby invites her to continue her close physical
relationship with the child in a way that the father is unable to
duplicate.
This analysis suggests that while presumptions like primary
caretaker or continuation of ongoing relationships leave room for
either parent to become custodian in many cases, they would apply in the case of a newborn invariably to award custody to a
mother who herself had borne the child, as long as the mother
was fit.
From the point of view of fairness to the father, the rule has
obvious shortcomings, since there is nothing he could do or
could have done (at least without continuing his relationship
with the mother for a longer period) that would put him in a
position of equality with the natural mother. But unless the father has a more satisfactory presumption to suggest, 4 5 there is a
compelling argument for a presumption operating to resolve the
bulk of custody contests rather than making courts decide on
has not offered to marry the mother.
144. E.g. Ainsworth, Object Relations, dependency & attachment: a theoretical review of the infant-mother relationship, Child Development 40, 969-1025 (1969); Ainsworth, The Development of Infant-Mother Interaction Among The Ganda, in B.M. Foss
(ed.), Determinants of Infant Behavior 11 (1963); J. Bowlby, Maternal Care and Maternal
Health and Deprivation of Maternal Care 59 (1966); Bowlby, Foreward to Determinants
of Infant Behavior (B.M. Foss, ed.) (1961); Bowlby, The Nature of The Child's Tie to his
Mother, Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 39, 350-73 (1978). See also supra note 131.
145. John's argument would be that a presumption in favor of the party who would
have custody under the contract would be more fair because at least the parties agreed
to this result at one point in the past. This argument is troublesome, however, as it
would allow unwed fathers who entered surrogacy contracts to have much clearer rights
to custody of newborns than even fathers married to birth mothers would have.
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the basis of all the facts and circumstances which of two persons
would make the better parent.
Two problems with custody contests were referred to above:
(1) the importance of any large monetary disparity between the
parents, which gives an advantage to the parent with the longest
purse for litigation-an advantage that parent may use either to
obtain custody for himself or to negotiate a settlement that will
leave child support unreasonably low; and (2) the difficulty of
proving in court which parent would be better when both meet
the criterion of fitness.
There always are problems in determining on the basis of a
judicial hearing which of two fit parents would be the better custodian. A great deal depends not upon the reality outside the
courtroom but upon the impression the parties make in court,
the strength of the psychiatric testimony they produce, how well
they prompt the child, etc., etc. For example, a person with less
experience of the world, or of having to present herself in a good
light, or a person very nervous coming to the forum where her
motherhood may be taken from her, may make a very bad impression even though she is impressive in her home and in her
role as a mother.
In the surrogacy situation, there are several factors that exacerbate the usual problems and that make even more troublesome the spectre of two biological parents battling out the custody issue on the basis of who will be the better parent. First, in
the surrogacy situation, there are likely to be significant wealth
and class differences between the would-be adopters and the
surrogate mother and her family. Frequently in custody contests
the question arises how the law is to measure the attributes of
one particular set of parents against another, and which factors
a court should take into account. 4 6 Surrogacy arrangements are
likely to involve the troublesome question whether and how factors associated with wealth and influence, or the superior educa146. Should a court take into account the religious practices of the parties, for exampie, or would that involve the state in establishing or penalizing religion in violation of
the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution? See Quiner v.
Quiner, (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1967), reprinted in AREEN, FAMILY LAW 444-51 (2d ed.
1985). Should the court evaluate the parties' lifestyles, and exercise a preference for the
one that is the most mainstream, or does that violate the parties' rights to privacy and to
equal protection?
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tion of one of the parties, should properly be counted into the
14 7
equation when a judge assesses the best interests of the child.
These are awkward questions in our system. In one sense a judge
may believe that the child will be better off in the more well-todo household; but to take factors like wealth into account carries
some of the same connotation discussed before of commercialization and sale of the having and raising of children. Moreover,
it raises an additional spectre-that of the poor or uneducated
being deprived of their children in order to benefit the wealthy
and established.
The likely existence of these disparities that it is troublesome for the law to address and that are especially likely to exist
in a surrogacy situation is made worse because it is especially
likely in a situation involving a newborn that there will not be
much evidence besides the position and lifestyles of the competing parents. At the outset, when the suit is brought, neither biological parent has had much experience parenting this newborn
child; and indeed neither may have had experience parenting at
all.1 48 We all know that it is not always predictable who will take
to parenting and who will not. In custody contests involving
newborns, the inquiry would be even more speculative than
usual, and the judge would have very few direct facts to rely
upon.

1 49

Of course during the litigation, one parent or another will
have custody of the child, so that parent will be building a relationship upon which a judgment could pass. Indeed that parent
(and that parent's family) will be building with the child the
kind of pyschological relationship that it arguably will be harmful to the child to have disturbed if the judge's finding goes for
the other parent. It is indeed this fact that lays the foundation
147. "[Tlhe whole sorry business of surrogate motherhood is riddled with economic
bias. It's rife with messages about buying and selling children, about who can 'afford' to
have them." Goodman, The word that's not mentioned in the Baby M case, Boston
Globe, Feb. 17, 1987, at 15, col. 4-5.
148. Even if the evidence shows that the surrogate mother is doing a fine job raising
her other child, how is her mothering to be compared with the nonexistent parenting of
the father and his wife?
149. Not only is there less evidence available on which to make a disposition, there is
also less need here for a custody dispute than there may be when an older child is involved. An older child may have views and feelings about the outcome that should be
heard and taken into account. A newborn, of course, is not scarred by a custody battle
between her parents in the way an older child who is aware of the proceedings can be.
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for the most compelling reason why we should not set up a system where the custody of newborns will turn on comparative fitness of the child's biological parents.
If we were to have a system turning upon the general comparative qualities of the parties as parents, and if (as seems necessary) a temporary disposition is to be made at the outset on
the basis of less than a full hearing, then is a judge making a
final disposition to take into account facts that transpired and
relationships that formed during the period when the temporary
order was in effect? There are serious problems either way we
decide this question. If the judge takes into account that during
this period the child has bonded with her custodians, that they
have become her psychological parents, and that it would be
detrimental to the child to alter the placement she has adjusted
to, then the temporary disposition seems to have effectively determined the entire controversy. That does not seem fair to the
parent who was denied temporary custody on the basis of less
than a full hearing concerning the factors the law says are determinative. If on the other hand the judge determines it would not
be fair to build the permanent disposition off of the temporary
one, because that gives too great an advantage to the winner of
the temporary order, then the child runs the risk of having to
sever a parental relationship that is important to her and to
start over with another parent or parents; it is this loss of the
psychological parent that many persons think is seriously detrimental to the psychological development of the child.
The best solution to the dilemma is to have a clear rule governing who will be the custodial parent. Such a rule would serve
best by encouraging parents not to litigate at all. If it is clear
under the law who will win any custody battle, it seems likely
that many of those battles will not come into court. Furthermore
if a judge knows what the law is and it is clear how it applies on
the facts of any particular case, the judge can apply that rule
and have it govern an initial, temporary disposition, as well as a
later one. That would solve the dilemma of whether to count in
the period of temporary custody whichever way that question is
resolved. 150
150. If one believes that the events that take place during the temporary disposition
should be taken into account in a final custody decree, the fact that the rule is clear and

1987]

THE LEGAL ISSUES

It is important, then, to have a clear rule as to who the custodian should be. Any clear rule or presumption could serve this
purpose. 15 1 One such clear rule is a rule awarding custody to
mothers, as long as they are fit. That rule, however, if made in
those terms, is unconstitutional gender-based discrimination. Although arguments could be framed for many possible presumptions, the presumption for the primary caretaker and the presumption for the continuation of a successful placement seem
most beneficial to the child. And in the context of disputes involving newborns, these presumptions would appear invariably
1 52
to favor the woman who has borne the child.
C. Problems Concerning Visitation and Child Support
One important difference between proceeding upon a theory
of contract or adoption, and proceeding through the model of a
custody dispute between unwed parents, is that visitation and
child support are concomitants of a custody dispute, but would
not arise under a typical surrogacy arrangement 53 or under the
laws of adoption. 54 There are significant differences in the reeasy to apply and can be applied correctly at the outset makes it unobjectionable that
the temporary disposition in fact controls the whole case. The only problem with the
temporary disposition being controlling would be if it differed from the final disposition.
And if one believes that the events taking place during the temporary custody should not
play a part in the final disposition, a clear and easy-to-apply rule is also helpful, because
it is important to the child that the final disposition come out the same as the initial one.
151. Of course if it is an ironclad rule and not a presumption, it will lead to even
greater certainty. But it may nonetheless be better to have a presumption and to have
some flexibility to adjust the outcome to the needs and equities of the particular case.
All rules have depended upon a finding that the parent awarded custody is fit, for
example, so parties always can litigate the issue of fitness. But it is difficult for a parent
to prevail when in order to do so he must prove the other parent actually unfit, and the
likelihood of losing would presumably deter many from litigating if fitness were the only
issue, unless they have a strong case.
152. Nonetheless there would not be an absolute correlation with gender. See supra
note 132.
153. Of course parties could contract that there would be visitation, or even that the
surrogate mother would pay support. The latter provision seems most unlikely, and the
former one is not the norm. Instead, parties usually opt to cut off the surrogate mother
entirely, just as adopting parents have classically replaced the natural parents, cutting
off natural parents by adoption.
154. The traditional model is that the natural parents are altogether cut off and replaced by the adoptive parents, who are the only parents with any parental rights. Traditionally, unrelated adoption almost always involved anonymity between the natural family and the adoptive family, and the child also was not permitted to know about her
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sult, therefore, even if John and Diane (the natural father and
his wife) could successfully claim custody under a custody-battle
approach. For one thing, Diane would not be permitted to adopt
the child without the natural mother's consent; instead Mary
the Surrogate would remain the mother, and Diane would become a stepmother. Moreover, the natural mother would have
rights of visitation, which the court would arrange and order if
the parties could not reach agreement concerning them and
which might be either minimal or considerable, amounting in effect to a sharing of custody. And in several jurisdictions, the natural grandparents also would have rights of visitation.
The same pattern would apply if the natural mother received custody under the custody dispute approach. The father
(and perhaps his parents) would be entitled to visitation rights.
Moreover, the law concerning the obligations of unwed fathers
would seem to render him liable for child support, if the natural
mother opted to enforce this obligation against him.' 5
If the father who has contracted for a baby and hoped to
receive custody of the child conceived with his sperm is not permitted to enforce the contract and obtain custody, and also cannot prevail as the better parent for the child because the mother
is not unfit and at the time of litigation has a closer relationship
with the child than he does, it seems quite harsh to hold him to
support the child for eighteen years. Indeed the best course for
the father to take, if surrogacy arrangements are to remain legal
though not specifically enforceable, is to pick the surrogate carefully, to hope that she goes through with the arrangement, but if
she does not, to give up and try again through another surrogate
biological roots. This process is undergoing change, both through private adoption, where

the parties often (though not invariably) meet or know about each other, and also
through efforts of adoptees to acquire a right to find out about, or even to meet, their
natural parents.
Sometimes in private placements today, the parties arrange for the natural mother
to retain some rights to visit the child, or at least to meet the child and know the child as
she is growing up. There is nothing to prevent these arrangements if the parties desire
them, but they still are far from the norm. See Garrison, Why Terminate Parental
Rights?, 35 STAN L. REV. 423 (1983) and The best of both open and closed adoption
worlds: a call for reform of state statutes, 13 J. LEGIS. 292 (1986).
155. Mothers can be liable for child support as well as fathers, cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979). However, it seems unlikely that the father in a surrogacy arrangement would
be seeking support from a surrogate mother, because the father is likely to be much
wealthier than the mother.
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or adoption. This course is obstructed if the father incurs a large
and longstanding liability with the failed surrogacy arrangement.
While our instinct may be to exempt from support obligations the father who wants to put the unfortunate transaction
behind him, existing law may prove problemmatic. In other situations where the father could say the equities required not holding him responsible-where the mother deceived him into impregnating her, for example-courts have held that the father
remains liable. Two rationales seem most important to this rule:
(1) Child support is for the benefit of the child and not the
mother; it would be wrong to make the child suffer and be deprived of the support of her other parent because of the conduct
of the mother, even if it is questionable. (2) It would not be satisfactory to have a rule that turned upon the equities of the impregnation, because there is rarely hard and convincing evidence
upon which a court could confidently decide this question, and
efforts to do so would involve the court in many private details
of persons' lives that it would be best for it to avoid.15
In In re Pamela P. v. Frank S. 15 7-the

most well-known

case involving deception-the reviewing court, for these reasons,
overturned a ruling of the family court that was an attempt to
protect the child's needs and also pay some heed to the equities
between the parties: The lower court had ruled that the father
should be liable for support only if the mother was not able to
shoulder that burden herself and would otherwise be dependent
upon welfare benefits to support the child.
While accepting the correctness of applying usual child support rules even where there is testimony that the mother
deceived the father into impregnating her 1""-an approach that
156. See, e.g., Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal.App.3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618
(1980)(father deceived into impregnating has no cause of action in tort because "claims
such as those presented . . . arise from conduct so intensely private that the courts
should not be asked nor attempt to resolve such claims").
157. 88 A.D.2d 865, 451 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1982), afl'd 59 N.Y.2d 1, 462 N.Y.S. 819, 449
N.E.2d 713 (1983), reversing 110 Misc. 2d 978, 443 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.C.
1981)(father who was tricked into impregnating a woman is not liable for child support
as long as the mother's income is sufficient to meet "the child's fair and reasonable
needs").
158. Although the issue of pregnancy-by-deception is raised extremely frequently in
paternity suits, it is invariably a losing issue. See, e.g., Hughes v. Hutt, 9 Fam. L. Rept.
(BNA) 2278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); In re K.A.Y., 10 Fam. L. Rept. (BNA) 1195 (Wisc. Ct.
App. 1983).
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ideally would encourage potential fathers to take some responsibility for birth control rather than make it solely the responsibility of their partners-I conclude that the usual child support
rules should not apply in the situation of the broken surrogacy
contract. One reason they may not apply in some jurisdictions is
that sperm donors are shielded from child support suits. (In
those jurisdictions fathers would also usually lose any right to
litigate against a fit mother for custody.) But even when there is
no such statute, the balance of equities, and the possibility that
the wisest course for all concerned is for the father to accept the
disappointment and turn his attentions elsewhere would argue
for an exception to the usual support requirements imposed on
unwed fathers, or a modification like that imposed by the lower
court in Pamela P. imposing liability only if the child lives in
poverty without it. While I am sympathetic with the ruling of
the reviewing court in Pamela P.-that it is not worth having
court battles over how and why someone became pregnant in order to weed out a few cases where the mother consciously
deceived the father-the same type of issue would not arise in
surrogacy cases. It is clear how the pregnancy occurred; the facts
and the plan are set out in a contract between the parties, a
contract that the mother decided not to perform. If the mother,
who has decided to keep the child after all, has the capability
adequately to support the child without the father's assistance,
and if the father wishes to cut his ties with the biological child
who was the product of the broken agreement, then the mother
and her family should provide the sole support, even though the
child might be better off with additional money from the natural
father coming in.
This suggestion leaves us in the position that we are not
content simply to fit surrogacy arrangements into existing laws.
It shows there is a need for some special law specific to surrogacy contracts, even if in general we try to address the problems
these contracts raise by applying law that is already developed.1 5 (Moreover, if the opportunity to impose support upon
159. Similarly in the adoption discussion in jurisdictions where rules allowed the natural mother to revoke after the baby had been placed in an adoptive home, I suggested
that an exception could made for surrogacy. There, however, it seemed that the rule
proposed for surrogacy was the rule that ought to govern all adoptions. In this case, by
contrast, I would not disrupt the general rule holding unwed fathers other than sperm
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the father clearly exists, that would complicate the analysis of
whether a mother might have something to gain by entering a
surrogacy arrangement with the real intent of pulling out when
the time came to surrender the child.)
This new twist in the law would apply only in those circumstances in which the father made the decision that the course he
should take is to put behind him the situation that produced his
biological child. While one can sympathize with a father who in
these circumstances feels he has to make that decision, one can
as readily imagine a different reaction-a feeling by the biological father that he wants to maintain contact with his offspring
and know her as she grows up, even though he is not permitted
to be her custodian. If the father does choose to take this course,
he should be entitled to visitation rights on the same terms as
other fathers who are not married to the mother of their child.
And a father who opts to take that course should be liable for
support on the same basis as other unwed fathers are. Similarly,
a fit surrogate mother who loses custody of her child (as can
happen in a jurisdiction that chooses to resolve these matters by
comparative fitness contests) should have visitation rights on the
same basis as other unwed parents deprived of custody.
CONCLUSION

In sum, good arguments can be made that surrogacy contracts should be altogether prohibited, but if they are not they
should not be subject to specific performance. Instead, the natural mother should have the right to renounce the contract (and
pay back any money she has received under it) up until the time
she turns the child over to the couple who arranged for the conception. Once the child moves into the home of the natural father and his wife, however, the contract takes full effect, and the
rights of the mother to claim the child terminate.
If the mother rejects the contract, the biological father
should not be able to prevail in a custody dispute with her as
long as she is a fit parent, which almost always will be the case.
donors responsible for child support without regard to the circumstances of the
conception.
The rule proposed for fathers in the surrogacy context is similar to rules sometimes
applied to semen donors. See supra notes 104 and 105.
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Instead of disputing with the mother, the father should accept
that the adoption did not go through and turn his attentions to
arranging another adoption, through a surrogacy arrangement or
otherwise. If he elects to develop and maintain a relationship
with the biological child that he produced through his agreement, he has the right to do so, and the relationship he then
develops will receive even constitutional protection, equivalent
to that afforded other noncustodial fathers. If he does opt to develop such a relationship, he also becomes liable for child
support."' 0
These rules avoid the spectre of child being taken from
mother and the maternal bond severed because of a contract.
Moreover, they are clear and specific. It is extremely important
to have clear and specific rules in this area, enabling persons to
know their rights and to avoid litigation as much as possible and
enabling any litigation to be swift and easily resolved. I believe
that under this approach surrogate motherhood contracts will
continue to be executed and performed and that they will not be
substantially deterred.161 But even if they were deterred, that
would not be good reason for abandoning these rules.
There is no reason for society to encourage surrogacy contracts. Given society's interests in discouraging commercialization of sex and childbearing, preventing exploitation of women,
and encouraging the adoption of existing children, appropriate
positions for jurisdictions to take towards surrogacy range anywhere between prohibitionof surrogacy contracts and tolerance
of them. As jurisdictions adopt provisions concerning surrogacy,
I would expect them to divide in various ways between these
strategies but not deliberately to promote surrogacy or to be disturbed if some of the regulations they adopt from a balancing of
160. Moreover, the father should not have the right to change back and forth. Once
he takes on the responsibility to act as a natural father towards the child, he should be
bound to continue that responsibility, as other natural fathers are, until the child reaches
majority. The child should not be subject to the father taking on and then renouncing
responsibilities, as other things in the father's life make the child more or less convenient
for him.
161. If the father were required to be liable for child support, the deterrence would
be much greater, although surrogacy arrangements would still be entered into by couples
willing to take their chances on selecting a surrogate willing to perform. Women wanting
to be mothers, however, might be correspondingly encouraged to enter the arrangements
fraudulently.
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the various needs result in discouraging some persons from entering into surrogacy arrangements.

